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ABSTRACT 
In this dissertation, we present two novel methods for supervised anomaly 
detection. The first method "K-Means+ID3" performs supervised anomaly detection by 
partitioning the training data instances into k clusters using Euclidean distance similarity. 
Then, on each cluster representing a density region of normal or anomaly instances, an 
ID3 decision tree is built. The ID3 decision tree on each cluster refines the decision 
boundaries by learning the subgroups within a cluster. To obtain a final decision on 
detection, the k-Means and ID3 decision trees are combined using two rules: (1) the 
nearest neighbor rule and (2) the nearest consensus rule. The performance of the K-
Means+ID3 is demonstrated over three data sets: (1) network anomaly data, (2) Duffing 
equation data, and (3) mechanical system data, which contain measurements drawn from 
three distinct application domains of computer networks, an electronic circuit 
implementing a forced Duffing equation, and a mechanical mass beam system subjected 
to fatigue stress, respectively. Results show that the detection accuracy of the K-
Means+ID3 method is as high as 96.24 percent on network anomaly data; the total 
accuracy is as high as 80.01 percent on mechanical system data; and 79.9 percent on 
Duffing equation data. Further, the performance of K-Means+ID3 is compared with 
individual k-Means and ID3 methods implemented for anomaly detection. 
in 
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The second method "dependence tree based anomaly detection" performs 
supervised anomaly detection using the Bayes classification rule. The class conditional 
probability densities in the Bayes classification rule are approximated by dependence 
trees, which represent second-order product approximations of probability densities. We 
derive the theoretical relationship between dependence tree classification error and Bayes 
error rate and show that the dependence tree approximation minimizes an upper bound on 
the Bayes error rate. To improve the classification performance of dependence tree based 
anomaly detection, we use supervised and unsupervised Maximum Relevance Minimum 
Redundancy (MRMR) feature selection method to select a set of features that optimally 
characterize class information. We derive the theoretical relationship between the Bayes 
error rate and the MRMR feature selection criterion and show that MRMR feature 
selection criterion minimizes an upper bound on the Bayes error rate. The performance of 
the dependence tree based anomaly detection method is demonstrated on the benchmark 
KDD Cup 1999 intrusion detection data set. Results show that the detection accuracies of 
the dependence tree based anomaly detection method are as high as 99.76 percent in 
detecting normal traffic, 93.88 percent in detecting denial-of-service attacks, 94.88 
percent in detecting probing attacks, 86.40 percent in detecting user-to-root attacks, and 
24.44 percent in detecting remote-to-login attacks. Further, the performance of 
dependence tree based anomaly detection method is compared with the performance of 
naive Bayes and ID3 decision tree methods as well as with the performance of two 
anomaly detection methods reported in recent literature. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Anomaly detection is the process of identifying unusual events occurring in a 
system by analyzing the audit data generated from monitoring the system's activities. 
Some examples of a "system" include a computer host running several software 
applications, a computer network comprising hundreds of nodes, an electronic circuit 
implementing arithmetic operations, and a mechanical mass beam structure under fatigue 
stress. Some examples of "unusual events" include unexpected behaviors of software 
applications (e.g., sudden shutdowns, memory and buffer overflows, etc.) in the case of a 
computer host, unexpected bursts in TCP/IP traffic passing through a computer network, 
unexpected response measurement from an electronic circuit, and the occurrence of an 
evolving crack in a mass beam structure. 
Based on the past research activity in anomaly detection, anomaly detection can 
be broadly classified into (1) supervised anomaly detection, and (2) unsupervised 
anomaly detection. In supervised anomaly detection, the types of anomalies that may 
occur in a system are known a priori. Therefore, the problem of supervised anomaly 
detection becomes that of identifying whether an event is an anomaly, and if it is, then the 
specific type of anomaly to which it belongs. On the other hand, in unsupervised anomaly 
detection, the types of anomalies that may occur are largely unknown. Therefore, a 
1 
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typical approach to solve the unsupervised anomaly detection problem is to build a 
profile of normal behavior of the system and then identify all events that significantly 
deviate from the normal profile as anomalies. 
Recently, new forms of anomaly detection employing data mining techniques [1], 
called Anomaly Detection using Data Mining (ADDM) methods, have emerged in the 
literature. ADDM methods perceive the anomaly detection problem as a data 
classification problem in which data instances, representing events, are classified as 
normal or as anomalies. To classify data instances, ADDM methods employ a wide range 
of data mining and machine learning techniques like neural networks [2][3], decision 
trees [4], support vector machines [5], fuzzy logic [6], symbolic dynamics [7][8], self-
organizing maps [9], Markov chain models [10], discrete Markov models [11], and 
association rules [12]. ADDM methods have gained popularity in both supervised and 
unsupervised anomaly detection fields because of their abilities to (1) automatically 
extract anomaly signatures, (2) detect new anomalies, (3) maintain high detection 
accuracies with low false positive rates, and (4) scale on large distributed datasets. 
In this dissertation, we present two supervised anomaly detection methods: (1) the 
K-Means+ID3 anomaly detection method and (2) the dependence tree based anomaly 
detection method. Both methods build on existing data mining methods (i.e., k-Means 
clustering, ID3 decision tree learning, and dependence tree approximations of joint 
probability densities) and therefore can be classified as ADDM methods. However, the 
two anomaly detection methods differ in their approach to solve the supervised anomaly 
detection problem. The first method, K-Means+ID3, is designed to identify data instances 
as either "normal" or "anomaly". That means, from a classification point-of-view, the K-
3 
Means+ID3 method performs a two-category classification. Applications of such "two-
category" anomaly detection approaches exist in domains where data instances may be 
known to originate due to an anomaly but the class or type of anomaly itself is unknown. 
For example, in the case of detecting an evolving crack in a mechanical system under 
fatigue stress, it may be known that the data instances generated during the evolution of 
the crack corresponds to an anomaly; however, to what specific anomaly type the data 
instance belongs is unknown. The second method, dependence tree based anomaly 
detection, is designed to identify specific types of anomalies. That is, the dependence tree 
based anomaly detection method performs multi-category classification. Applications of 
such "multi-category" approaches to anomaly detection exist in domains where data 
instances are known to belong to normal or to specific types of anomalies. An example of 
such an application domain is the detection of computer network attacks, where the type 
of anomaly is known to belong to one of the several attack types like denial-of-service 
attack, probing attack, user-to-root access attack, etc. Next, we present a brief overview 
of the K-Means+ID3 anomaly detection method and the dependence tree based anomaly 
detection method. 
1.1 K-Means+ID3 Anomaly Detection Method 
The K-Means+ID3 anomaly detection method cascades two data mining 
algorithms: (1) k-Means clustering [13] and (2) the ID3 decision tree learning [14] for 
classifying normal and anomaly data instances. In the first stage of K-Means+ID3, k-
Means clustering is performed on training instances to obtain k disjoint clusters using 
Euclidean distance similarity. The k-Means algorithm is used to organize the training 
instances into disjoint subsets or "clusters," where each member in a cluster is more 
4 
closely related to other members in its associated cluster than to members in other 
clusters. In the second stage of K-Means+ID3, each cluster of training instances is further 
subject to ID3 decision tree learning. In ID3 learning, the ID3 algorithm builds a decision 
tree from the cluster of training instances. The leaf nodes of the ID3 decision tree contain 
the class name whereas a non-leaf node is a decision node. Each leaf node contains one 
of the two classes: (1) normal or (2) anomaly. 
Once the training set is organized into clusters and associated ID3 decision trees, 
test data is compared to the classification system established by the training data set. 
Using this classification system, an unknown test instance is (1) examined for closeness 
to the clusters, and (2) for the closest clusters (i.e., the clusters that are closest by 
Euclidean distance between the test data instance and the clusters' centroids), the 
decision on the test instance as normal or anomaly is given by each cluster's ID3 decision 
tree. The ID3 decision tree's decision is contrasted with the k-Means cluster's decision, 
and the first conformity between the two decisions is the decision assigned to the 
unknown data instance. 
Experiments were performed on three datasets: (1) Network Anomaly Data 
(NAD), (2) Duffing Equation Data (DED), and (3) Mechanical System Data (MSD), 
which contain measurements from three distinct application domains of computer 
networks, an electronic circuit implementing a forced Duffing equation, and a mechanical 
mass-beam system respectively. Anomaly detection performance of the K-Means+ID3 
method was gauged using six performance measures: (1) detection accuracy, (2) false 
positive rate, (3) area under Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, (4) 
precision, (5) total accuracy (or recall), and (6) F-measure. Results show that the 
5 
detection accuracy of the K-Means+ID3 method is as high as 96.24% at a false positive 
rate of 3.66% on NAD; the total accuracy is as high as 80.01% on MSD and 79.9% on 
DED. 
1.2 Dependence Tree Based Anomaly Detection Method 
Dependence trees approximate an w-dimensional joint probability distribution as a 
product of second-order component distributions, that is, probability distributions 
conditioned on at most one variable. The component probability distributions are selected 
such that they maximize the mutual information [15] between features. For the purpose of 
anomaly detection, we use dependence trees to approximate the class conditional 
probability density "P(X | co)", which is the probability that an unknown data instance 
X occurs given that it belongs to a class variable co. The class variable co is one of 
normal, a denial-of-service attack, a probing attack, a user-to-root attack, or a remote-to-
login attack. Once the class conditional probability densities are obtained, through Bayes 
formula [13], the class conditional probability density is transformed to posterior 
probability P(co | x), which is the probability of occurrence of a class co given an 
unknown data instance X. The data instance X is then assigned to a class with the 
highest posterior probability. 
Because dependence tree construction is an optimization procedure that 
maximizes mutual information between features, the features with high correlation tend 
to have high mutual information (see [16]). However, when features are highly 
correlated, the respective class-discriminative power changes little if some of the features 
are removed. Therefore, to reduce correlation within the features in dependence trees, we 
perform feature selection using the supervised and unsupervised versions of the 
6 
Maximum Relevance Minimum Redundancy (MRMR) feature selection method. Further, 
we theoretically show that the MRMR feature selection criterion minimizes an upper 
bound on the Bayes error rate. 
To demonstrate the performance of the dependence tree based anomaly detection 
method, experiments were performed on KDD Cup 1999 benchmark intrusion detection 
datasets [41]. The KDD Cup 1999 datasets contain labeled instances of normal and attack 
traffic originating from the MIT-DARPA simulated computer network testbed [17]. 
Results show that the dependence tree based anomaly detection has category-wise 
detection accuracy as high as 99.76% for normal, 93.88% for denial-of-service attacks, 
94.88% for probe attacks, 86.40% for user-to-root attacks, and 24.44% for remote-to-
login attacks. The dependence tree based anomaly detection method is further compared 
with two classifier based anomaly detection methods: (1) the naive Bayes [13] anomaly 
detection and (2) the ID3 decision tree based anomaly detection as well as with intrusion 
detection models reported in Bouzida et al. [18] and Song et al. [19]. 
1.3 Contributions of the Dissertation 
The contributions of the dissertation are enumerated as follows: 
• The dissertation presents "K-Means+ID3," a novel method to cascade the k-
Means clustering and ID3 decision tree learning methods for mitigating the 
Forced Assignment and Class Dominance problems of the k-Means method for 
classifying data originating from normal and anomalous behaviors in a computer 
network, an active electronic circuit, and a mechanical mass beam system under 
fatigue stress. 
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• The dissertation evaluates the performance of K-Means+ID3 classifier and 
compares it with the individual k-Means clustering and ID3 decision tree methods 
using six performance measures. 
• From a classification perspective, the dissertation presents a novel method for 
cascading two successful data partition methods for improving classification 
performance. From an anomaly detection perspective, the dissertation presents a 
high performance anomaly detection method. 
• The dissertation presents a dependence tree based anomaly detection method for 
detecting attacks on a computer network. Further, the Maximal Relevance 
Minimum Redundancy (MRMR) feature selection method is used to obtain an 
optimal set of features for attack detection using dependence trees. 
• The dissertation presents a theoretical relationship between dependence tree 
classification error and Bayes error rate and shows that the dependence tree 
approximation procedure minimizes an upper bound on Bayes error rate. 
• The dissertation presents a theoretical relationship between MRMR feature 
selection and Bayes error rate and shows that the MRMR feature selection 
criterion minimizes an upper bound on the Bayes error rate. 
• The dissertation evaluates the performance of the dependence tree based anomaly 
detection method in detecting attacks on a computer network, and compares it 
with two popular classification methods, namely, the naive Bayes method and the 
ID3 decision tree method. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses related 
research in anomaly detection. Chapter 3 introduces the K-Means+ID3 anomaly detection 
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method and discusses anomaly detection with individual k-Means and ID3 methods. 
Chapter 4 details the training and testing phases of the K-Means+ID3 method. Chapter 5 
discusses the datasets used to evaluate the K-Means+ID3 method. Chapter 6 presents the 
results of the K-Means+ID3 method. Chapter 7 presents the dependence tree based 
anomaly detection method. Chapter 8 presents theoretical relationship between the 
dependence tree classification error and Bayes error rate. Chapter 9 introduces the 
MRMR feature selection method and presents the relationship between MRJV1R feature 
selection criterion and the Bayes error rate. Chapter 10 discusses the KDD Cup 1999 
dataset used for evaluating the performance of the dependence tree based anomaly 
detection method. Chapter 11 presents the results of the MRMR feature selection method 
and the dependence tree based anomaly detection method. We conclude the dissertation 
and identify future research directions in Chapter 12. 
CHAPTER 2 
RELATED RESEARCH 
In this chapter, we present recent research work related to anomaly detection. This 
chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents related research on 
anomaly detection in computer networks. The second section presents related research on 
anomaly detection in other domains (e.g., mechanical fatigue-crack detection, anomaly 
detection in computer hosts, anomaly detection in electronic circuits, etc). 
2.1 Anomaly Detection Research in Computer Networks 
Sarasamma et al. in [9] presented a multilevel hierarchical Kohonen network to 
implement a network anomaly detection system. Their motivation for implementing a 
multilevel Kohonen network was that the single-layered Kohonen network, though 
effective in grouping similar input vectors into clusters, does not guarantee an optimal 
separation of resulting clusters. Further, the experiments with single-layered Kohonen 
network on KDD Cup 1999 network intrusion detection data have resulted in 
unacceptably high false positive rates. On the other hand, an anomaly detection system 
based on a multilevel hierarchical Kohonen network combined with domain knowledge 
based grouping of features in KDD Cup 1999 dataset has resulted in detection accuracy 
as high as 97.19% for denial-of-service attacks, 87.88% for probe attacks, 66.52% for 
9 
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user-to-root attacks, and 0.37% for remote-to-login attacks. These detection accuracies 
were achieved at a false positive rate of 2.92%, which was the lowest false positive rate 
achieved by the hierarchical Kohonen network. 
Sarasamma et al. in [20] presented a hyperellipsoidal clustering technique for 
supervised anomaly. The hyperellipsoidal clustering technique is implemented as a self-
organizing map in which the winning cluster is decided based on the Mahalanobis 
distance between the input vector and the cluster mean. A new cluster is initiated if the 
Mahalanobis distance between the input vector and the winning cluster center is greater 
than a predefined threshold. The motivation for using Mahalanobis distance as a transfer 
function in the self-organizing map comes from the assumption that each cluster 
originates from a multivariate Gaussian distribution function. The locus of points of 
constant density for a multivariate Gaussian distribution function geometrically forms a 
hyper ellipsoid with constant radius given by Mahalanobis distance. By applying 
hyperellipsoidal clustering on KDD Cup 1999 network traffic datasets, Sarasamma et al. 
[20] achieved a detection accuracy of 83.97% for denial-of-service attacks, 91.31%o for 
probe attacks, 84.56%> for user-to-root attacks, and 33.78%) for remote-to-login attacks at 
a false positive rate of 2.68%. 
Song et al. in [19] presented a genetic programming approach to supervised 
anomaly detection. The Random Subset Selection-Dynamic Subset Selection (RSS-DSS) 
algorithm was proposed for dynamically filtering large datasets for subsequent 
classification in genetic programming paradigm. The RSS-DSS algorithm initially 
divides the entire training set into small blocks to allow incremental loading on to the 
main memory. Next, a block is selected with uniform probability and a subset of training 
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patterns are selected from the block based on two parameters: (1) age and (2) difficulty. 
Training is performed on the selected subset of patterns through an evolutionary phase 
which involves "crossover" and "mutation" operations of genetic programming. Three 
different fitness functions: (1) equal class cost, (2) variable class cost, and (3) hierarchical 
cost are used to determine the best evolutionary phases. In [19], experiments were 
conducted on KDD Cup 1999 datasets and only the first eight "basic" features were 
utilized. The RSS-DSS genetic programming approach achieved a detection accuracy of 
95.6% for denial-of-service attacks, 48.5% for probe attacks, 10.1% for user-to-root 
attacks, and 0.2% for root-to-login attacks. These attack detection accuracies were 
reported at a false positive rate of 0.27%. 
Qu et al. in [21] introduced a new correlation measure to select features for 
classification and data mining tasks. Their correlation measure, measured between any 
two features, is known as Decision Dependent Correlation (DDC). The DDC measures 
correlation in terms of two components: (1) the correlation between features and the class 
variable, calculated as sum of mutual information between two features and the class 
variable, and (2) the correlation between features, calculated as the mutual information 
between the two features. The first component quantifies the relevance of features with 
the class variable and the second component quantifies the redundancy within features. 
Feature selection is performed by maximizing the first component and minimizing the 
second component of the DDC measure. Qu et al. [21] performed experiments on the 
KDD Cup 1999 dataset. By incrementally using DDC measure to select a set of features 
and by using a linear discriminant function to perform classification, Qu et al. achieved 
99.93% detection accuracy with 0.07% false positive rate for denial-of-service attacks, 
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99.91% detection accuracy with 0.09% false positive rate for probe attacks, 91.13% 
detection accuracy with 9.258% false positive rate for user-to-root attacks, and 92.47% 
detection accuracy with 8.35% false positive rate for remote-to-login attacks. It is to be 
noted here that Qu et al. performed two-category attack detection (i.e., identifying a 
single attack type in the presence of normal traffic) as opposed to multi-category attack 
detection, as performed by earlier mentioned works of Sarasamma et al. [9][20], Song et 
al. [19], and the dependence tree based anomaly detection method of this dissertation. 
Bouzida et al. in [18] performed anomaly detection in network traffic using 
nearest neighbor classification and C4.5 decision trees. The use of nearest neighbor 
classification for anomaly detection was motivated by the fact that its classification error 
is bounded by twice the Bayes error rate, the least possible classification error that can be 
achieved by any classification method (see [22]). The use of C4.5 decision trees for 
anomaly detection in network traffic was motivated by the robustness of C4.5 decision 
trees in handling noisy data and by their high classification performance in various 
application domains such as automated patient classification, image classification, etc. 
(see [23]). Further, to reduce the dimensionality of data, Bouzida et al. performed feature 
extraction using principal component analysis. Experiments performed on the KDD Cup 
1999 datasets using the nearest neighbor classification rule and four principal 
components resulted in 97.14% detection accuracy for denial-of-service attacks, 74.4% 
detection accuracy for probe attacks, 7.91% detection accuracy for user-to-root attacks, 
and 0.80% for root-to-login attacks, at a false positive rate of 0.5%. Experiments with 
C4.5 decision trees and four principal components resulted in 97.25% detection accuracy 
for denial-of-service attacks, 66.80% detection accuracy for probe attacks, 6.58% 
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detection accuracy for user-to-root attacks, and 0. 01% detection accuracy for remote-to-
login attacks, with 1.0% false positive rate. 
2.2 Anomaly Detection Research in Other Domains 
Khatkhate et al. in [1] presented the symbolic time series analysis method for 
detecting anomalies resulting from fatigue cracks in ductile alloys. The first step in 
symbolic time series analysis involved partitioning the time series for constructing 
symbol sequences. For this purpose, Khatkhate et al. [1] used wavelet space partitioning, 
in which the time series data was converted into wavelet space at different scales and 
time shifts. Next, graphs of wavelet coefficients verses the scales were stacked starting 
with the smallest value of the scale and ending with the largest value. This wavelet space 
was then partitioned using the maximum entropy partitioning. A Hidden Markov Model 
(HMM) was used to probabilistically score a given set of symbols as normal or anomaly. 
The scores from the HMM were compared with the scores from three machine learning 
methods, namely the Principle Component Analysis (PCA), Multi-Layer Perceptron 
Neural Network (MLPNN), and Radial Basis Function Neural Network (RBFNN). 
Khatkhate et al. empirically demonstrated that the symbolic time series method for 
anomaly detection outperforms PCA, MLPNN, and RBFNN in identifying early fatigue 
crack anomalies, while all the four methods performed well in detecting evolved 
anomalies. 
Chin et al. in [7] applied the concept of symbolic time series based anomaly 
detection to detect anomalies in a non-linear electronic system. The symbolic time series 
method was tested on an electronic system implementing a second-order, non-
autonomous forced Duffing equation. The dissipation parameter ' P ' , implemented as 
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resistance in the electronic circuit was varied between 0.10 - 0.35 to generate system 
response. The system response at $ = 0.10 was recorded as normal and the response at 
P > 0.10 was recorded as anomaly. Three machine learning methods-namely PC A, 
MLPNN, and RBFNN-were used to compare the anomaly detection performance of the 
symbolic time series method. Results of the experiments in [7] showed that the symbolic 
time series analysis method outperformed the PCA, MLPNN, and RBFNN methods in 
detecting slowly evolving anomalies, i.e., the system response when p is between 0.15 
and 0.27. 
Ye et al. [24] present multivariate statistical analysis of audit trails for host-based 
intrusion detection. Hotelling's T2 test and the chi-squared (%2) test, which are 
multivariate statistical process control techniques, were used to analyze audit trails. The 
Hotelling's T2 statistic and the %2 statistic were used to calculate the amount of deviation 
between a given test sample and the normal (in-control) population. Experiments were 
performed on two datasets: (1) a four hour Basic Security Model (BSM) audit trail data 
consisting of 1,406 audit trails of normal events and 1,225 events of intrusive activities 
and 2) a large BSM audit trail containing 3,174,584 normal events and 48,000 audit trails 
of intrusive events. Accuracy results and Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves 
on these datasets showed that the chi-squared test results were either better than or 
comparable to the Hotelling's test for both the datasets. The reason for the relatively 
better performance of the chi-squared test, as hypothesized by Nong Ye et al., was that 
the intrusive activities manifest themselves mainly through mean shifts, which the chi-
squared test has captured very effectively. 
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Chang et al. in [25] performed anomaly detection and classification in 
hyperspectral imagery using two methods: (1) Reed and Yu (RXD) method based on 
Mahalanobis distance and (2) Low Probability Detection (LPD) method. In hyperspectral 
image analysis, anomaly detection refers to the identification of targets whose signatures 
are distinct from their surroundings. Chang et al. demonstrated that the RXD method 
coupled with linearly-constrained minimum variance classification method outperformed 
the LPD anomaly detection method in detecting anomalies in hyperspectral images of 
forest landscapes. Additionally, methods for anomaly detection appear in [42], [43], [44], 
[45], [46], [47], [48], and [49]. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE K-MEANS+ID3 ANOMALY 
DETECTION METHOD 
In this chapter, we introduce the K-Means+ID3 method for anomaly detection and 
briefly discuss anomaly detection with individual k-Means and ID3 learning algorithms. 
K-Means+ID3 is a novel supervised anomaly detection method developed by cascading 
two machine learning algorithms: (1) the k-Means clustering and (2) the ID3 decision 
tree learning. In the first stage, k-Means clustering is performed on training instances to 
obtain k disjoint clusters. Each k-Means cluster represents a region of similar instances, 
"similar" in terms of Euclidean distances between the instances and their cluster 
centroids. We choose k-Means clustering because (1) it is a data-driven method with 
relatively few assumptions on the distributions of the underlying data and (2) the greedy 
search strategy of k-Means guarantees at least a local minimum of the criterion function, 
thereby accelerating the convergence of clusters on large datasets. In the second stage of 
K-Means+ID3, the k-Means method is cascaded with the ID3 decision tree learning by 
building an ID3 decision tree using the instances in each k-Means cluster. Cascading the 
k-Means clustering method with ID3 decision tree learning alleviates two problems in k-
Means clustering: (1) the Forced Assignment problem, and (2) the Class Dominance 
problem. The Forced Assignment problem arises when parameter k in k-Means is set to a 
16 
17 
value considerably less than the inherent number of natural groupings within the training 
data. The k-Means procedure initialized with a low k value under estimates the natural 
groups within the training data and therefore will not capture the overlapping groups 
within a cluster, forcing the instances from different groups to be a part of the same 
cluster. Such 'forced assignments' in anomaly detection may increase the false positive 
rate or decrease the detection accuracy. As an example of forced assignment in an 
anomaly detection setting, consider an anomaly in network traffic originating from a 
particular type of attack (say a 'remote-to-user' attack) whose network traffic may be 
very similar to that of normal traffic. In this case, a low value of A: may force the k-Means 
to assign attack instances to a normal cluster because the value of k is insufficient to 
capture the inherent sub-group structure of the attack that differentiates it from the 
normal traffic; more specifically, the distance (similarity) between the attack instance and 
the cluster representing a normal class is less than the distance between the attack 
instance and the cluster representing an anomaly class. The second problem which K-
Means+ID3 alleviates, Class Dominance, arises in a cluster when the training data have a 
large number of instances from one particular class and very few instances from the 
remaining classes. Such clusters, dominated by a single class, show weak association to 
the remaining classes. That is, when classifying an anomaly associated with a cluster 
dominated by normal instances or vice-versa, decisions based exclusively on the 
probabilistic likelihood of the instance being associated with the cluster will most likely 
misclassify the instance. The Forced Assignment and Class Dominance problems cause 
instances from different classes, like the normal and anomaly classes in our case, to 
overlap within the same cluster. However, a decision tree trained on each cluster learns 
18 
the sub-grouping (if any) present within each cluster and refines the decision boundaries 
within the clusters dominated by a single class by partitioning the instances with a set of 
if-then constraints over the feature space. Cascading the decisions from the k-Means and 
ID3 methods involves two phases: (1) the Candidate Selection phase, and (2) the 
Candidate Combination phase. In the Candidate Selection phase, / clusters nearest in 
Euclidean distance between the cluster centroids and the test instance are selected. In the 
Candidate Combination phase, two rules are used-(l) the nearest consensus rule and (2) 
the nearest neighbor rule-to combine the decisions of the k-Means and the ID3 
algorithms to obtain a final classification decision over a test instance. 
We perform experiments on three datasets: (1) the network anomaly data, which 
is feature extracted from the 1998, 1999, and 2000 MIT-DARPA network traffic 
[17] [26] [27] using an artificial neural network based non-linear component analysis 
method presented in [28]; (2) the Duffing equation data [7], containing measurements 
from an active electronic circuit implementing a forced Duffing equation; and (3) the 
mechanical systems data [1], containing measurements drawn from a mechanical 
apparatus that excites a mass-beam structure for generating small fatigue cracks. The 
three datasets contain representative anomalous and normal behavioral patterns from 
three distinct domains of computer networks, an active electronic circuit system, and a 
mechanical system. Performance evaluation of the K-Means+ID3 cascading approach is 
conducted using six measures: (1) detection accuracy or True Positive Rate (TPR), (2) 
False Positive Rate (FPR), (3) precision, (4) total accuracy (or accuracy), (5) F-measure, 
and (6) Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves and Areas Under ROC Curves 
(AUCs). The performance of K-Means+ID3 is empirically compared with the 
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performance of individual k-Means clustering and the ID3 decision tree classification 
algorithms. Next, we briefly discuss the individual k-Means clustering and the ID3 
decision tree learning methods for anomaly detection. 
3.1 Anomaly Detection with Individual 
K-Means Clustering Method 
The k-Means algorithm groups N data points into k disjoint clusters where k is a 
predefined parameter. The steps in the k-Means clustering based anomaly detection 
method are as follows. 
1. Select k random instances from the training data subset as the centroids of the 
clusters C,,C2,...Q . 
2. For each training instance X. 
a. Compute the Euclidean distanceZ)(C(,X), i - l...k. Find cluster Cq that is 
closest to X. 
b. Assign X to C . Update the centroid of Cq. (The centroid of a cluster is the 
arithmetic mean of the instances in the cluster.) 
3. Repeat step (2) until the centroids of clusters Cl,C2,...Ck stabilize in terms of mean-
squared-error criterion. 
4. For each test instance Z: 
a. Compute the Euclidean distance£>(C;,Z), i = \...k. Find cluster Cr that is 
closest to Z. 
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b. Classify Z as an anomaly or a normal instance using either the Threshold rule 
or the Bayes Decision rule. The Threshold rule for classifying a test instance Z 
that belongs to cluster Cr is 
Assign Z —> 1 ;/ P(colr \Z <=Cr)>r; Otherwise Z -» 0, 
where '0 ' and ' 1 ' represent normal and anomaly classes, coXr represents the 
anomaly class in cluster Cn P{colr \Z eCr) represents the probability of 
anomaly instances in Cr, and r is a predefined threshold. In our experiments, 
the threshold is set to 0.5 so that a test instance is classified as an anomaly 
only if it belongs to a cluster that has anomaly instances in majority. The 
Bayes Decision rule is 
Assign Z -> 1 if P(a>lr | Z e Cr) > P(a>0r | Z e Cr}, Otherwise Z -> 0, 
where co0r represents the normal class in cluster Cr, P(co0r \Z e C r ) is the 
probability of normal instances in cluster Cr. 
3.2 Anomaly Detection with ID3 Decision Tree Learning 
The ID3 decision tree learning algorithm computes the Information Gain G on 
each attribute A, defined as 
\s I 
G(S,A) = Entropy(S)- ^ \-^Entropy(S
 v), 
veValues(A) \^\ 
where S is the total input space, ,SV is the subset of S for which attribute A has a value v. 
c 
The Entropy\S) over c classes is given by ^ - / ? , log2 (/?,), where /?, represents the 
probability of class '/'. The attribute with the highest information gain, say B, is chosen 
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as the root node of the tree. Next, a new decision tree is recursively constructed over each 
value of B using the training subspaceS- {SB}. A leaf-node or a decision-node is formed 
when all the instances within the available training subspace are from the same class. For 
detecting anomalies, the ID3 decision tree outputs binary classification decision of '0' to 
indicate normal and ' 1 ' to indicate anomaly class assignments to test instances. 
CHAPTER 4 
TRAINING AND TESTING THE 
K-MEANS+ID3 ANOMALY 
DETECTION METHOD 
We are provided with a training dataset (X;.,l^), i = 1,2,..., N where Xj 
represents an w-dimensional continuous valued vector and Yt = {O, l} represents the 
corresponding class label with '0 ' for normal and ' 1 ' for anomaly. The K-Means+ID3 
method has two steps: (1) training and (2) testing. During training, steps 1-3 of the k-
Means based anomaly detection method are first applied to partition the training space 
into k disjoint clusters C1,C2,...Ck. Then, an ID3 decision tree is trained with the 
instances in each k-Means cluster. The k-Means method ensures that each training 
instance is associated with only one cluster. However, if there are any sub-groups or 
overlaps within a cluster, the ID3 decision tree trained on that cluster refines the decision 
boundaries by partitioning the instances with a set of if-then rules over the feature space. 
The testing step of the K-Means+ID3 has two phases: (1) the Candidate Selection phase 
and (2) the Candidate Combination phase. In Candidate Selection, decisions from k-
Means and ID3 based anomaly detection methods are extracted. In Candidate 
Combination, the decisions of the k-Means and ID3 decision tree methods are combined 
to give a final decision on the class membership of a test instance. For combining the k-
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Means and ID3 decision tree methods, we present two combination rules: (1) the nearest 
neighbor rule, and (2) the nearest consensus rule. A detailed explanation of the two 
phases follows. 
4.1 The Candidate Selection Phase 
Figure 4.1 presents the procedure for the Candidate Selection. Let 
DTx,DT1,...DTk be the ID3 decision trees on clusters C,,C2 , . . .Q formed by applying 
the k-Means method on the training instances. Let rx,r2,...rk be the centroids of 
Cl,C2,...Ck respectively. Given a test instance Z., the Candidate Selection procedure 
extracts anomaly scores from/candidate clusters Gl,G2,...Gk. The '/candidate clusters' 
are / clusters in C,, C2,... Ck that are nearest to Z, in terms of the Euclidean distance 
between Z; and the cluster centroids. Here,/is a user-defined parameter. 
iripili* l e s t ins tances £•» / — 7 » . «o
 ( f vaJLue. 
Output:. Anomaly score matrix for Z-„ i - 1. . .n. 
Procedure CandldataijSeiection { 
Step 1: For each test instance Z.-
a. Compute Euclidean distance D(l-F y , y « 1. . . *, 
and find/clusters closest to Zj. 
D. Compute kHbteans and 103 decision tree scores 
for fnearest {candidate) clusters. 
Step 2; Return ftnomlay Score Matrix for Zj. 
} /* End Procedure */ 
Figure 4.1 Procedure of Candidate Selection. 
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Figure 4.2 illustrates the extraction of anomaly scores from k-Means clustering 
and ID3 decision tree learning methods for / candidate clusters. Let ml,m2,...,mf 
represent the centroids of candidate clusters GnG2,...,Gf. LetDyZ^mJ- dx, 
D(Zj,m2) = d2, and D[Zj,mf) = df, represent the Euclidean distances between the test 
vector Z( and the/candidate clusters. The k-Means anomaly scores Ps, s = 1,. . . , / , for 
each of the/ candidate clusters is given by 
P,=PM* 1 — d. Equation 4.1 
'=1 
where P((ols) is the probability of anomaly instances in cluster ' s '. In Equation 4.1, the 
term' 1 • 
d. S 9 is called the Scaling Factor (SF). 
Zj Test Instance 
k
 ^r^) f k-Means Clusters 
ID3 Decision Trees 
P,* = f K ) x 1 - -
Zf l (Z,v, ) 
Anomaly 
Score Matrix 
Figure 4.2 Extraction of k-Means and ID3 decision tree scores from/= 3 candidate 
clusters for the test instance Zu 
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The SF scales P(cou ) by weighing it against the ratio of the Euclidean distance 
between the cluster 5 and Z,; and the sum of Euclidean distances between Z, and the 
clusters Ci,C2,...Ck. The SF penalizes the probability of anomaly P{cou) in cluster s 
with its distance from the test vector Z, i.e., a high value of ds yields a low/^ value and 
vice versa. The decisions from the ID3 decision trees associated with the / candidate 
clusters are either '0 ' representing normal or ' 1 ' representing an anomaly classes. The 
Candidate Selection phase outputs an anomaly score matrix with the decisions extracted 
from the k-Means and ID3 anomaly detection methods for a given test vector. The 
decisions stored in the anomaly score matrix are combined in the Candidate Combination 
phase to yield a final decision on the test vector. A detailed description of the Candidate 
Combination follows. 
4.2 The Candidate Combination Phase 
The input to the Candidate Combination phase is the anomaly score matrix 
containing the anomaly scores Ps, s = l,...,f, of the k-Means and the decisions of the 
ID3 based anomaly detection methods over / candidate clusters. To combine the 
decisions of the k-Means and ID3 algorithms, we first harden the anomaly scores of the 
k-Means method by using the Threshold Rule presented in Section 2.1. Next, we use two 
rules: (1) the nearest consensus rule and (2) the nearest neighbor rule to combine the 
decisions. 
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4.2.1 The Nearest Consensus Rule 
Figure 4.3 shows an example of an anomaly score matrix for the test vector Z. 
The/candidate clusters G,,G2,...,Gf are ordered in the anomaly score matrix such that 
the distances d1,d2,...,df between Z and the candidate clusters G,,G?,...,Gf 
respectively, satisfy d, < d2 < ... < df. In the nearest consensus rule, the decision of the 
nearest candidate cluster in which consensus exists between the decisions of the k-Means 
and the ID3 decision tree methods is selected as the combined classification decision. For 
example, in the anomaly score matrix shown in Figure 4.3, the nearest consensus occurs 
in candidate cluster G2 and therefore the test vector is classified as ' 1' i.e., an anomaly. 
Gj GQ G% Gf 
k-Means 
ID3 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
*>*<•« *>«*•>*>* **#» 
" « . . . - . . -
1 
0 
f 
Consensus 
Figure 4.3 An example anomaly score matrix for test instance Z. The anomaly 
scores of the k-Means method are hardened using the Threshold rule. 
4.2.2 The Nearest Neighbor Rule 
The nearest neighbor rule chooses the decision of the ID3 decision tree associated 
with the nearest candidate cluster within the / candidate clusters. In the anomaly score 
matrix shown in Figure 4.3, G, is the nearest candidate cluster to the test vector Z. 
Therefore, the nearest neighbor rule classifies the test vector as '0' (normal), which is the 
decision of the ID3 decision tree associated with candidate cluster G,. 
CHAPTER 5 
DATASETS FOR TESTING THE 
K-MEANS+ID3 METHOD 
In this chapter we discuss three experimental datasets: (1) Network Anomaly Data 
(NAD), (2) Duffing Equation Data (DED), and (3) Mechanical Systems Data (MSD). 
The NAD contains three data subsets: (i) NAD-98, (ii) NAD-99, and (iii) NAD-00, 
obtained by feature-extracting the 1998, 1999, and 2000 MIT-DARPA network traffic 
corpora. The DED dataset was obtained from an active non-linear electronic circuit 
implementing a second-order forced Duffing equation. The MSD dataset was obtained 
from an apparatus designed to induce small fatigue cracks in ductile alloy (mass beam) 
structures. 
Table 5.1 summarizes the proportion of normal and anomaly instances, and the 
number of dimensions in the three datasets. The training and testing data subsets were 
randomly drawn from the original NAD, DED, and MSD datasets. The number of 
instances in all the training data subsets was restricted to utmost 5000 instances, with 
70% of them being normal and the rest being anomaly instances. The testing datasets 
contain utmost 2500 unseen instances (i.e., those excluded in training data subsets), with 
80% of them being normal and the remaining 20% being anomaly instances. The ratio of 
training datasets to the testing datasets is 65% to 35% except for the NAD-2000 and DED 
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datasets. The NAD-2000 and DED datasets contain comparatively less number of 
training and testing instances because of the limited number of normal instances available 
in DED and the limited number of anomaly instances available in NAD-2000. Therefore, 
the training-to-testing dataset ratio for DED is 60% to 40% and for the NAD-2000 is 50% 
to 50%. A brief description of each dataset follows. 
Table 5.1 Characteristics of the NAD, DED and MSD datasets used in the anomaly 
detection experiments. 
Datasets 
NAD 
1998 
1999 
2000 
DED 
MSD 
Dimensions 
12 
10 
10 
4 
4 
Training Instances 
Normal 
3500 
3500 
294 
1288 
3500 
Anomaly 
1500 
1500 
126 
502 
1500 
Testing Instances 
Normal 
2000 
2000 
336 
860 
2000 
Anomaly 
500 
500 
84 
215 
500 
5.1 Network Anomaly Data 
The NAD-98, NAD-99, and NAD-00 data subsets contain artificial neural 
network based Non-Linear Component Analysis (NLCA) feature-extracted 1998, 1999, 
and 2000 MIT-DARPA network traffic [28], respectively. The 1998 MIT-DARPA 
datasets [17] were collected on an evaluation test bed simulating network traffic similar 
to that seen between an Air Force base (INSIDE network) and the Internet (OUTSIDE 
network). Thirty-eight different attacks (documented in [17]) were launched from the 
OUTSIDE network. Approximately seven weeks of training data and two weeks of test 
data were collected by a sniffer deployed between the INSIDE and OUTSIDE network. 
List files provide attack labels for the seven-week training data. However, the list files 
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associated with the test data do not contain attack labels. For this reason, we use only the 
seven-week training data for both training and testing purposes. The 1999 MIT-DARPA 
datasets [26] were generated on a test bed similar to that used for 1998 MIT-DARPA 
datasets. Twenty-nine additional attacks (documented in [26]) were developed. The 
datasets contain approximately three weeks of training data (with two weeks of data 
exclusively containing normal traffic) and two weeks of test data. In our experiments we 
use the tcpdumps collected by the sniffer in the INSIDE network on weeks 1, 3, 4 and 5. 
The tcpdumps from Week-2 were excluded because the list files associated with datasets 
were not available. The 2000 MIT-DARPA datasets [27] are attack-scenario specific 
datasets. The datasets contain three attack scenarios simulated with the background traffic 
being similar to those in 1999 MIT-DARPA datasets. The first dataset, LLS DDOS 1.0, 
simulates a 3.5 hour attack scenario in which a novice attacker launches a Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against a naive adversary. The second dataset, LLS 
DDOS 2.0.2, is a two-hour stealthy DDoS attack scenario. The third dataset, Windows 
NT Attack, is a nine-hour dataset containing five phased Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack 
on Windows NT hosts. 
5.2 Duffing Equation Data 
This section describes the preparation of the Duffing Equation Dataset (DED). 
Chin et al. [7] use an active non-linear electronic circuit to generate the data. The circuit 
implements a second-order, non-autonomous, forced Duffing equation represented as 
*l*fL + p(ts)^± + x(t) + x3(t) = Acoscot 
dt2 '' dt 
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The dissipation parameter j3(ts), implemented as resistance in the circuit, varies in 
the slow-time ts and is constant in the fast time-scale t at which the dynamical system is 
excited. Although the system dynamics is represented by a low order differential 
equation, it exhibits chaotic behavior that is sufficiently complex from thermodynamic 
perspectives and is adequate for illustration of the anomaly detection concept. The goal is 
to detect, the changes in /3(ts), which are associated with an anomaly. Setting the 
stimulus with amplitude A = 5.5 and&>= 5.0 rad/sec, the stationary behavior of the 
system response for this input stimulus is obtained for several values of (3 in the range of 
0.10 to 0.35. In all our experiments with DED, we have considered the datasets with/? = 
0.1, p = 0.32, p = 0.33, p = 0.34, and p = 0.35 to randomly select 1790 instances for 
preparing the training data subsets and 1075 unseen random instances for preparing the 
test data subset. 
5.3 Mechanical Systems Data 
This section discusses the preparation of Mechanical System Data (MSD). 
Khatkhate et al. [1] present the test apparatus to generate the MSD. The test apparatus has 
two subsystems: (1) the plant subsystem consisting of the mechanical structure including 
test specimens (i.e., the mass-beams that undergo fatigue crack damage), electro-
magnetic shakers, and displacement measuring sensors; and (2) the instrumentation and 
control subsystem consisting of the hardware and software components related to data 
acquisition and processing. The mechanical structure of the test apparatus is persistently 
excited near resonance to induce a stress level that causes fatigue cracks in the mass 
beam specimens and yields an average life of approximately 20,000 cycles or 36 minutes. 
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The mass beams attain stationary behavior in the fast-time scale of machine vibrations 
when persistently excited in the vicinity of its resonant frequency. Fatigue cracks occur at 
a slow time scale that is slow relative to the fast time scale dynamics of the vibratory 
motion. The goal here is to detect the slowly evolving anomaly, possibly due to fatigue 
cracks, by observing the time series data from displacement measuring sensors. There is a 
total of 36 minutes of data. The first two minutes of data are considered transient 
(normal) and the rest from 3 to 36 minutes of data are considered as steady state 
asymptotic behavior (anomaly). In all our experiments with MSD, we used the data 
recorded during the 1st, 33rd, 34th, 35th, and the 36th minute to randomly select 5000 
instances for preparing the training data subsets and 2500 unseen random instances for 
preparing the test data subset. 
CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS OF K-MEANS+ID3 ANOMALY 
DETECTION METHOD 
In this chapter we present the results of the K-Means+ID3 method with the 
nearest neighbor and nearest consensus combination rules and compare it with the 
individual k-Means and ID3 decision tree methods over the NAD, DED, and MSD 
datasets. We use six measures for comparing the performance^ 1) TPR or recall is the 
percentage of anomaly instances correctly detected, (2) FPR is the percentage of normal 
instances incorrectly classified as anomaly, (3) 'precision' is the percentage of correctly 
detected anomaly instances over all the detected anomaly instances, (4) 'total accuracy' 
or 'accuracy' is the percentage of all normal and anomaly instances that are correctly 
classified, (5) the 'F-measure' is the equally-weighted (harmonic) mean of precision and 
recall, and (6) the ROCs [29] and AUCs [30] give the performance of an anomaly 
detection system with FPR on the x-axis and TPR on the y-axis. The performance 
measures: precision, recall, and F-measure determine how the K-Means+ID3, the k-
Means, and the ID3 methods perform in identifying anomaly instances. The performance 
measure 'accuracy' determines the number of normal and anomaly instances correctly 
classified by the anomaly detection methods. The measures FPR and AUC determine the 
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number of false positives that the anomaly detection systems generate at specific 
detection accuracies. The results of our experiments on the NAD, DED, and MSD follow. 
6.1 Results on the NAD-1998 Dataset 
Here we present the results of the k-Means and ID3 decision tree based anomaly 
detection methods and the K-Means+ID3 method over the NAD-1998 datasets. Figure 
6.1 illustrates the performance of the k-Means, the ID3, and the K-Means+ID3 methods 
averaged over 10 trials for k-means and K-means+ID3. For the NAD-1998 datasets, the k 
value of the k-Means method was set to 20. For the ID3, the training space was 
discretized into 45 equal-width intervals. For the K-Means+ID3 cascading method the k 
was set to 20 and the data discretized into 45 equal-width intervals. The choice of k value 
used in our experiments was based on 10 trial experiments conducted with A: set to 5, 10, 
15, and 20. The performance of the k-Means based anomaly detection showed no 
significant improvement when k value was set to a value greater than 20. Similarly, the 
choice of the number of equal-width intervals for discretization was based on 19 
experiments conducted with different discretization values (e.g. 10, 15,..., 100). Figure 
6.1 shows that: (i) the K-Means+ID3 cascading method based on Nearest Neighbor (NN) 
combination rule has better performance than the k-means and ID3 in terms of TPR, FPR, 
Precision, and Accuracy; (ii) the TPR, FPR, Precision, Accuracy, and F-measure of the 
K-Means+ID3 cascading with NC combination is in-between the k-Means and the ID3; 
and (iii) the K-Means+ID3 with NN combination outperforms the k-Means and ID3 
algorithms in terms of F-measure, obtained from combining precision and recall. 
Figure 6.2 shows the ROC curves and AUC values for the k-Means, ID3 and K-
Means+ID3 methods. The ROC curves for the K-Means+ID3 and the k-Means 
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algorithms were plotted for the trials with the AUC values closest to the mean TPR 
values shown in Figure 6.1. The ROC for K-Means+ID3 cascading algorithm with NN 
combination rule shows that the best TPR is achieved at 0.76 with an FPR as low as 0.05. 
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Figure 6.1 Performance of the k-Means, the ID3 decision tree, and the K-
Means+ID3 method with Nearest Neighbor (NN-Rule) and Nearest 
Consensus (NC-Rule) combination rules over the NAD-1998 
test dataset. 
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Figure 6.2 ROC Curves and AUCs of k-Means, ID3, and K-Means+ID3 with NN-
Rule and NC-Rule over the NAD-1998 test dataset. 
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6.2 Results on the NAD-1999 Dataset 
Figure 6.3 illustrates the performance of the k-Means, the ID3, and the K-
Means+ID3 methods averaged over 10 trials for k-Means and K-Means+ID3. For the 
NAD-1999 datasets, the k value of individual k-Means was set to 5. For the ID3 
algorithm, the training space was discretized into 25 equal-width intervals. For the K-
Means+ID3 cascading, the value of k was set to 5 and the data was discretized into 25 
equal-width intervals. 
Figure 6.3 shows that (i) the K-Means+ID3 cascading with NC combination has 
better performance than the k-Means and ID3 in terms of TPR, and (ii) precision, 
accuracy, and F-measure of the K-Means+ID3 with NN combination is higher than the k-
Means and ID3. 
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Figure 6.3 Performance of the k-Means, the ID3 decision tree, and the K-
Means+ID3 method with Nearest Neighbor (NN-Rule) and Nearest 
Consensus (NC-Rule) combination rules over the NAD-1999 
test dataset. 
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Figure 6.4 shows the ROC curves and AUC values of the k-Means, ID3 and K-
Means+ID3 methods over NAD-1999. The ROC curves for K-Means+ID3 and k-Means 
method were plotted for the trial with the AUC values closest to the mean TPR values 
shown in Figure 6.3. The K-Means+ID3 cascading with NN and NC combination has the 
same AUC performance as compared to k-Means and ID3 methods. 
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Figure 6.4 ROC Curves and AUCs of k-Means, ID3, and K-Means+ID3 with NN-
Rule and NC-Rule over the NAD-1999 test dataset. 
6.3 Results on the NAD-2000 Dataset 
Figure 6.5 illustrates the performance of the k-Means, the ID3, and the K-
Means+ID3 methods averaged over 10 trials for k-Means and K-Means+ID3. For the 
NAD-2000 datasets, the k value of the k-Means was set to 10. For the ID3 algorithm, the 
training space was discretized into 15 equal-width intervals. For the K-Means+ID3 
cascading algorithm, we set the value of k to 10 and discretized the data into 15 equal-
width intervals. 
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Figure 6.5 shows that (i) the K-Means+ID3 cascading with NN combination has 
better performance than the k-Means and ID3 in terms of FPR and Precision, (ii) the TPR 
of the K-Means+ID3 cascading is less than the k-Means and ID3 methods, and (iii) the 
accuracy of the K-Means+ID3 is similar to the k-Means and ID3 methods. 
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Figure 6.5 Performance of the k-Means, the ID3 decision tree, and the K-
Means+ID3 method with Nearest Neighbor (NN-Rule) and Nearest 
Consensus (NC-Rule) combination rules over the NAD-2000 
test dataset. 
Figure 6.6 shows the ROC curves and AUC values of the k-Means, ID3 and K-
Means+ID3 methods over NAD-2000 test dataset. The ROC curves for the K-
Means+ID3 and k-Means methods were plotted for the trial with the AUC value closest 
to the mean TPR values in Figure 6.5. The ROC curves for the k-Means, and ID3 
methods show better performance than the K-Means+ID3 cascading algorithm over the 
NAD-2000 datasets. 
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Figure 6.6 ROC Curves and AUCs of k-Means, ID3, and K-Means+ID3 
methods over the NAD-2000 test dataset. 
6.4 Results on the Duffing Equation Dataset 
Figure 6.7 illustrates the performance of the k-Means, the ID3, and the K-
Means+ID3 methods averaged over 10 trials for k-Means and K-Means+ID3. For the 
DED datasets, the k value for the k-Means was set to 5 clusters. For the ID3, the training 
space was discretized into 45 equal-width intervals. For the K-Means+ID3 method, we 
set the value of A: to 5 and discretized the data into 45 equal-width intervals. 
Figure 6.7 shows that (i) the K-Means+ID3 cascading with NC and NN 
combination has better performance than the k-Means in terms of FPR, precision, and 
accuracy, (ii) the F-measure of the K-Means+ID3 cascading is in-between the k-Means 
and the ID3, (iii) the TPR of the k-Means+ID3 is less than the k-Means and ID3 methods. 
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Figure 6.7 Performance of the k-Means, the ID3 decision tree, and the K-
Means+ID3 method with Nearest Neighbor (NN-Rule) and Nearest 
Consensus (NC-Rule) combination rules over the DED 
test dataset. 
Figure 6.8 shows the ROC curves and AUC values of the k-Means, ID3 and K-
Means+ID3 methods over DED. The ROC curves for K-Means+ID3 and k-Means 
algorithm were plotted for the trial with the AUC value that is closest to the mean TPR 
values shown in Figure 6.7. The ROC curve for the K-Means+ID3 cascading with NC 
and NN combinations is in-between the k-Means and the ID3 methods over the DED test 
datasets. 
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Figure 6.8 ROC Curves and AUCs of k-Means, ID3 and K-Means+ID3 
methods over the DED test dataset. 
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6.5 Results on the Mechanical Systems Dataset 
Figure 6.9 illustrates the performance of the k-Means, the ID3, and the K-Means+ID3 
algorithms averaged over 10 trials for k-Means and K-Means+ID3. For the MSD 
datasets, the k value of the k-Means was set to 5. For the ID3 method, the training space 
was discretized into 65 equal-width intervals. For the K-Means+ID3 method, we set the 
value of & to 5 and discretize the data into 65 equal-width intervals. 
Figure 6.9 shows that: (i) K-Means+ID3 with NC combination has better 
performance than the k-Means in terms of FPR, precision, and F-measure, and (ii) the 
precision, accuracy, and the F-measure of the K-Means+ID3 with NC combination is 
higher than the k-Means method. 
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Figure 6.9 Performance of the k-Means, the ID3 decision tree, and the K-
Means+ID3 method with Nearest Neighbor (NN-Rule) and Nearest 
Consensus (NC-Rule) combination rules over the MSD 
test dataset. 
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Figure 6.10 shows the ROC curves and AUCs of the k-Means, ID3 and K-
Means+ID3 methods over MSD. The ROC curves for K-Means+ID3 and k-Means 
methods were plotted for the trial with the AUC value that is closest to the mean TPR 
values in Figure 6.9. The ROC curves for the K-Means+ID3 with NN combination shows 
a TPR rate as high as 0.98 at a FPR of 0.4 over the MSD test dataset. 
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Figure 6.10 ROC Curves and AUCs of k-Means, ID3 and K-Means+ID3 
methods over the MSD test dataset. 
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CHAPTER 7 
ANOMALY DETECTION USING 
DEPENDENCE TREES 
In this chapter we present the details of dependence tree based anomaly detection 
method for detecting attacks on a computer network system. The goal of the dependence 
tree based anomaly detection method is to build dependence trees that achieve high 
classification accuracy in detecting five types of network traffic instances originating 
from: (1) normal traffic, (2) denial-of-service attacks, (3) probing attacks, (4) user-to-root 
attacks, and (5) remote-to-login attacks. The two major motivations for using dependence 
trees for detecting network attacks is as follows: 
• Dependence trees have an advantage of making the classification models more 
explicit with regard to features and their relationships. Such explicit 
representations of relationships between features facilitate the ensuing steps of 
network forensic analysis and vulnerability inspections over the feature space, 
which are inevitably performed for effective corrective actions. 
• Dependence trees, being probabilistic by nature, assign probability scores 
indicating the "degree" to which a network traffic instance belongs to particular 
type of attack. Such quantitative assignments of scores to network traffic 
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instances will assist human experts and network administrators in culling the false 
positives generated by the attack detection system. 
Next, we present the problem formulation for network attack detection using the 
dependence tree based anomaly detection method. 
7.1 Problem Formulation 
Let X = (x1,x2,...,xn) denote an ^-dimensional feature vector. The feature vector 
X represents a set of n measurements recorded over a computer network (e.g., type of 
service, protocol, number of source bytes, etc.). Let W = {co/,co2,...,cor} denote a set of r 
classes. The set W represents five types of network traffic instances, i.e., normal, denial-
of-service attack, probing attack, user-to-root attack, and remote-to-login attack. We 
assign an optimal label co* e W to X using the Bayes classification rule, given by 
p(co* | x) = max{p(©ft | X)} Equation 7.1 
where P{(nk | X) is the posterior probability of the class cot e W given the feature vector 
X. Using Bayes formula [13], the posterior probability can be expressed as a function of 
class-conditional probability P[X \ tok) by 
p{pk, x) = pfoHr|a> t) Equat.on 12 
r 
where P(co/.) is the prior probability of class a>k and ^ ] P(wJl )P(X | coA) is the 
normalization factor that scales the posterior probability between 0 and 1. Through 
Equation 7.2, the problem of classifying X into one of the r classes becomes one of 
estimating the class-conditional probability function P{X | co .^). However, estimating 
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P{X | o^) involves computations of (exponential) order TV", where m is the number of 
features and N is the number of unique values in each feature. The exponential 
complexity makes estimating P\X \ a)k) infeasible when dealing with a large number of 
features, which are typically available for the anomaly detection problem. Therefore, we 
estimate the class-conditional probability with a product of second-order joint probability 
distributions using dependence tree approximation. The dependence tree approximation 
requires at most (N2* m2) computations, which mean far fewer computations than N™ even 
for moderate values of TV and m. Here, it is important to note that we build a number of 
dependence trees equal to that of the classes available (i.e., five classes in our case). 
7.2 Dependence Trees 
Chow and Liu [31] first introduced dependence trees to approximate an nth order 
discrete joint probability distribution using a product of second order discrete joint 
probability distributions. Let X = (x,,x2,...,xn) denote an ^-dimensional discrete 
random feature vector. Let P\X) = P(x;, x2,..., xn) be the joint distribution of the feature 
vector. In dependence tree approximation, the joint probability distribution 
P\xl, x2,..., xn) is approximated by P\X) as 
P(X) « P{X) = f\p{xmi | xmm } 0 < j(i) < i, Equation 7.3 
i=l 
where {m1,m2,...,mr^) is an unknown permutation of integers 1,2,...,n, P\xm \ xm J is a 
component probability in which each feature xm is conditioned on at most one variable 
xm and the component probability of the form P\xm \x0j is by definition equal to 
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Figure 7.1 gives examples of two dependence trees containing four features 
(x,,x?,x3,x4). In Figure 7.1(a), the joint probability distribution P(x,,x2,x3,x4) is 
approximated by P{xl)p{x2 \x,)P{x3 \XJ)P{X4 \x,). In Figure 7.1(b), P\x1,x2,x3,x4) is 
approximated by P(x, )P(X2 | x, )P(X3 \ x, )P(X4 ) . Note that the dependence tree in (b) 
illustrates a case where there can be more than one independent component, i.e., P(x ;) 
and P(x4). 
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Figure 7.1 Dependence trees approximating the joint probability distribution 
P(xj,X2,X3^X4). The dependence tree in (a) approximates Pfxi^^^) as 
P(xi)P(x2\xi)P(xs\x2)P(x4\xi) and the dependence tree in (b) 
approximates P(xi^X2>X3^C4) as P(xj)P(x2\xi)P(x3\x2)P(x^. 
7.3 Steps for Building Dependence Trees 
Let X = {x1,x2,...,xn) be an n-dimensional discrete feature vector. Let 
,ra2,...,cor) denote a set of r classes. Let P\x,,x2,...,xl]) be the joint 
distribution to be approximated. There are five steps to build a dependence tree to 
approximate P{x;, x2,..., xn). 
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STEP 1) Find the mutual information Iyx^Xj) between all pairs of features, where 
[xl ,x.) are any two features in X - {x,, x2,..., xn) and i* j . The mutual 
information between the feature pair \x[ ,x . ) is defined as 
STEP 2) Build a complete undirected graph G with the features (x,,x2,...,xn) as 
vertices and the mutual information between the vertices as edge weights. 
STEP 3) Use Kruskal's algorithm [32] to find a maximum spanning tree in G. 
STEP 4) In the maximum spanning tree, choose any node as a root node and set the 
direction of all edges outwards, pointing towards the root node. 
STEP 5) Repeat STEP 1 through STEP 4 for each class in W. 
7.4 Optimality of Dependence Tree Approximation 
Chow and Liu, in [31], have shown that the dependence tree with the maximum 
edge weights (i.e., mutual information) gives the optimal second order approximation of 
P(X) = P(x,,..., xn), the true joint probability distribution of an n-dimensional feature 
vector X. A brief overview of their proof follows. 
Let P(X) be any second order dependence tree approximation of 
P(x) = P{xs ,...,xn). Then, the closeness of approximation between the 
probabilities P(x) and P(x) is quantified by the Kullback-Liebler divergence measure 
[15], given as 
rp{x)^ KL(p,p)=J^P(x)\og 
\H*)j Equation 7.4 
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With Equation 7.4, the problem of finding the optimal second order dependence tree 
approximation to P(x) is transformed into the problem of finding P(x) which 
minimizes KL\P,Pj. On replacing P{x) with the dependence tree approximation given 
in Equation 7.3, the Kullback-Leibler distance between P(x) and P(x) becomes 
= - Z 7 k , >*»m)+ Z " k ) - # M Equation 7-5 
where H(xm )= -£p(*m ( . Jlogifa J and tf(jr) = - ;>>(x) logP(x) . Because //(xm ) 
and i/(X) are independent of the dependence tree approximation, minimizing KL\P,P) 
is equivalent to maximizing the total mutual information^l\xm ,xm J. Thus, the 
problem of finding the optimal dependence tree approximation P(x) is transformed to 
that of finding a dependence tree with maximum total branch weight. 
7.5 Estimating Mutual Information 
Estimating mutual information between pairs of features involves estimating the 
marginal and joint probabilities of features. To estimate the marginal and joint 
probabilities, we use relative frequencies derived from the training samples. Let P(x.,xy.) 
be the joint probability distribution of two features xt and x,. The value of P\xt,x,) is 
calculated as 
/ x F(Xl=U,Xj=v) 
p{x. = u>Xj=v) = t 
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where F\xt = u,Xj = v) denotes the number of training samples whose feature x, is equal 
to u and whose feature x
 j is equal to v. T denotes the total number of training samples. 
Similarly, the marginal distributions of the features xt and *., that is, Pyx^ and P\x.) 
are calculated as 
, F(X. =U) I \ Fix,. =v) 
P{xt = u) = - L L _ J and p(x ; = v) = - ^ — ; 
where F(xt = u) is the number of training samples whose feature x{ is equal to u and 
F\x, = v) is the number of training samples whose feature x, is equal to v. 
CHAPTER 8 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEPENDENCE 
TREE CLASSIFICATION ERROR AND 
BAYES ERROR RATE 
Let X = (xl,...,Xn) denote an ^-dimensional discrete random feature vector. Let 
PF = {cOj,...,cor}, be a discrete random variable whose values are the class labels. Let 
P(x | co) be the conditional distribution of X given W, where x = (xj,..., xn) is a value 
of the feature vector X and co is a value of W. In Chow and Liu's dependence tree 
approximation, the probability distribution P(x | co) is approximated by P(x | co) as 
P(x | co) « P(x | co) = Y[ P{xmi | xm , co), 0 < j(i) < i, Equation 8.1 
where (m{,...,mn) is an unknown permutation of integers 1, 2, ..., n, P\xm \xm ,co) is a 
component probability in which each variable xm is conditioned on at most one 
variablexm , and the component probability of the form P(xi \x0,ca) is by definition 
equal to P(xt \ co). The unknown permutation is obtained using KruskaFs algorithm [32], 
which finds the spanning tree with maximum pairwise mutual information between the 
features. For notational simplicity, we will hereafter omit the subscript m of each variable 
and represent, for example, xm as xt. 
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Hellman and Raviv [33] proved that an upper bound on Bayes error rate "cre" is 
— H(G>\X), where H(G>\X) is the conditional entropy of class co given the n-
dimensional feature vectorX. Wong and Poon, in [34], extended Hellman and Raviv's 
result (see [35] for tighter bounds on the Bayes error rate) and showed that, under certain 
assumptions, Chow and Liu's dependence tree approximation procedure can be derived 
by minimizing the upper bound of the Bayes error rate. Wong and Poon's result comes 
from Equation (5) in their paper [34], which expands the entropy function //(co | X) and 
replaces P(X\(D) with probability distribution P(x\(o) using the dependence tree 
approximation. The equation appeared as 
//(co | X) = / /(co)- H(X)- X P ( c o ) X / . ( x , , X j { i ) ) - £ / > ( » ) £ H a ( X t ) Equation 8.2 
co i=l co i-1 
where 
//(co) = -£/>(co)logP(co), 
(1> 
H(x) = -^P{x)\ogP(x), 
'M.xJ^pi^^W -
 }. and 
Hu(Xl) = -^iP{xl\<a)logP{xl\(a). 
Xj 
The correct expansion of the conditional entropy function H{co\X) (derived in the 
next section) and is given as: 
/ / ( H X ) = / / ( c o ) - / / ( x ) - £ / > ( c o ) £ / > , , X J + X P ( C O ) £ / / J X , . ) . Equation8.3 
<o i=l,j(i)*0 co i=l 
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Equation 8.3 corrects Equation 8.2 by reversing the sign of the 
term ^  P(co)^ Ha (Xt). Though this correction appears as a minor issue, it invalidates 
the misleading idea purported by Equation 8.2 that every component probability in the 
dependence tree approximation decreases the value of i/(co | X) thereby reducing the 
upper bound on the Bayes error rate. The corrected equation (Equation 8.3) shows that 
each component probability in the dependence tree approximation, whether in the form 
ofP(x;. | x](i),(£s), j{i)*0, or P{xi |x0,co), adds^P(<x>)Ha(Xt) to H((o\X) and does 
CO 
not necessarily contribute toward decreasing the upper bound on Bayes error rate. 
Therefore, caution is advised when selecting component probabilities for dependence tree 
approximation. 
Below, we give two conditions to guarantee that every component probability in 
the dependence tree approximation decreases the value of H{co\X), thereby decreasing 
the upper bound on Bayes error rate. 
Condition 1: In a dependence tree approximation, for each component probability of the 
form P[xi | xJ(j), co), j(i) * 0, ^ P{(£>)la {X,, Xj^) should be greater than 
{0 
5>(coK(X,.). 
CO 
Condition 1 follows from expansion in Equation 8.9 in the derivation (in the next 
section) and concerns with component probabilities of the form P[xj | x;(0,co), j(i) =? 0 , 
in the dependence tree approximation. We explain Condition 1 with an example. Let 
X = (Xl ,X2,X3) be a three-dimensional discrete random feature vector. Let 
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P(X, \U>)P{X2 \XI,a)p(X3 |co) be the dependence tree approximation of P(X|co). In 
this dependence tree approximation, there is one component probability of the form 
P\xt. | xy(0,co), i.e., P{X2 | X\,co). Expansion in Equation 8.9 shows that each 
component probability of the form P[xi | xj{i), co) adds ^ ( © ^ ( J r , ) to H((o\X). 
CO 
Therefore, P(X2\X ,,<£>) adds £ > ( © ) # „ (X2) to#(<y|x). However, if 
^^(©Xo{X 2 ,X,) is greater Xhsa^PioijHa{X2), then from expansion in Equation 8.9 
we see that the presence of component probability P(X2 \ X,, co) in the dependence tree 
approximation decreases the value of i/(co| X), thereby decreasing the bound on Bayes 
error rate. 
Condition 2: In a dependence tree approximation, for each component probability of the 
form P{xi | x0,co),0 <i< n , there must be a nonempty set lt,\lt \<n , of component 
probabilities of the form P(xs \ x,., co), 0<s<n, so that ^ ^(co)^ Ia {Xs, Xi) is greater 
co n 
than Y^PWM)-
CO 
Condition 2 follows from Equation. 8.10 in the next section and concerns with 
component probabilities of the form P(xj \x0,(o). We explain Condition 2 with an 
example. Let X = (Xl,X2,X3,X4) be a four-dimensional discrete random feature 
vector. Let P(X!\(i))p(X2\Xl,(o)p(X3\X,,(o)p(X4\co) be the dependence tree 
approximation of P(X\(o). In this dependence tree (or more precisely, dependence 
forest) approximation, there are two component probabilities of the form P\xi \ x0, co), 
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i.e., P(X, | co) andP(X4 |co). Equation 8.10 shows that P(x, | co) and P(X4 | co) add 
^ / • ( © ^ ( X / ) and ^P(co)/7<i)(X4) to H{(o\x). NOW, consider the component 
CO (0 
probability i ,(X / | co). From Condition 2, /, contains all the component probabilities 
conditioned on Xx, i.e., /, = {P(X2 | X,, co), />(XJ | X,, co)}. 
If^Pfoft^X^X^ + I^X^X^^Pfoty^X,), then from Equation 8.10 we see 
CO CO 
that the presence of the variable X, decreases //(co | X), thereby decreasing the upper 
bound on the Bayes error rate. However, the component probability P\X4 | co) does not 
satisfy Condition 2 because /4 is an empty set. Therefore, the presence of P\X4 \ co) 
certainly increases i^(co | X), thereby increasing the upper bound on the Bayes error rate. 
Consequently, the variable X4 may be omitted when approximating P\X \ co). 
8.1 Derivation Relating Bayes Error Rate To 
Dependence Tree Classification Error 
It is known [15] that 
//(co | X) = / /(co)- l(X, co). Equation 8.4 
Using the definition of mutual information [5], /(X,co) in Equation 8.4 can be expanded 
as 
//(co|X)= //(co)-£/>(*,co)logP(x,co) + ][>(x,co)logP(x) + £/>(;<;,co)log/>(co) Equation 8.5 
X,(0 X,<Q X,(0 
By the definition of entropy 
^ P(x, co)logP(x) = Y, P(x)logP(x) = -H{X) and 
.r,co x 
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X P(x, co)log P(co) = X P(co)log P(co) = -//(<D) . 
Therefore, Equation 8.5 can be written as 
H(<a | X) = -H{X) - £ P(x, co)log P(x, co) = - # ( * ) - £ ^(©)£ ^ I «)log(P(* | co)p(co)) 
Equation 8.6 
Using dependence tree approximation in Equation 8.1, log(P(x | co)P(co)) in Equation 8.6 
is replaced bylog(p(x | co)P(co)), so that 
H(<o\X) = -H(X) + //(co) - X P(co)£ P(x | co)£ log P(X,. | x .(0, a>), 0 < j(i) < i 
co x i=l,j(i)*0 
TERM 1 
n . . 
- ^ P(co)^ P(x I co) ^ log P(x, I xy(0, co). Equation 8.7 
i=i,m=o 
TERM 2 
Term I (sign included) in Equation 8.7 contains the component probabilities of the 
form P(x, | xm,co), j(i) < 1, and j(i) & 0. Term II (sign included) contains the remaining 
component probabilities of the form P(x, | x0, co) = P(x,. | co). Term I can be expanded as 
- Z ^ ) 2 > ( * l « ) t togp/^w0'"!
 r I ^ ) Z ^ i c o ) Z l o g P k l c o ) . 
Equation 8.8 
Since P(X, , xm | co) and P(x,. | co) are components (marginal distributions) of P(x | co), 
we know that 
^ P(x,. | co)P(x
 (0 | co) ^ P(x. | co)P(x (/) | co] 
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X P{x | ©)log P{xt | <D) = £ Pfo | co)log P(x, I co). 
.Y .V,-
Therefore, the expansion in Equation 8.8 can be rewritten as 
- Z ^ ( » ) I / > , , ^ ( o ) + 2 > ( « ) 2 X W - Equation 8.9 
0) i=l,j(i)*0 co i=l,j(i)*0 
Expansion in Equation 8.9 shows that each component probability of the form 
p(xi \xj(i),(j$),j(i)*0, adds ^P(co)//a{X i) to / /(co|X). Now, consider Term II in 
CO 
Equation 8.7. Let there be K component probabilities of the form 
P{x, | x0, co) = P(x. | co). Then, Term II can be written as 
- X ^ ( « ) ) E ^ | c o ) i l o g ^ |co) = ~£ /> (« )£ £ P ( X , . |a>)logP(*, |CO) = £ P ( C O ) £ / / U ( X , ) 
Equation 8.10 
where K>\ and K <n from the definition of dependence tree approximation in 
Equation. 8.1. Equation 8.10 shows that each component probability of the form 
P(XJ \x0,eo) adds ^P(p)H a{Xi) to H(a>\X). By substituting Equation 8.9 and 
Equation 8.10 for Term I and Term II respectively, Equation 8.7 becomes 
//(co | X) = //(co) - H(X) - X P(co) £ /„ (x,, XJ(i)) + J P(co)£ //W (X,). 
co i=I,j{i)*0 co i=l 
CHAPTER 9 
MAXIMUM RELEVANCE MINIMUM 
REDUNDANCY FEATURE 
SELECTION 
Feature selection (in the context of classification) is the process of identifying the 
most characterizing features that minimize classification error [36]. Let dataset D 
contain M samples with ^-dimensional features, i.e., D = \X,,X2,...,XM} 
and Xt = {xl, x2,..., xn). Each sample in D belongs to one of the classes in 
,co2,...,cor}. The feature selection problem is to find a subset of k features that 
minimize classification error. One of the most popular methods of feature selection, 
known as the Maximum Relevance feature selection [37], selects features with the 
highest relevance to the target class W. In Maximum Relevance feature selection, 
"relevance" is usually characterized using correlation or mutual information between 
features and the classes. Mutual information is preferred over correlation because 
correlation captures only linear dependencies between features and classes where as 
mutual information captures linear as well as nonlinear dependencies (see [16]). A 
detailed investigation of the advantages of mutual information over correlation is given in 
[38], [39], and [40]. Next, we briefly discuss Maximum Relevance feature selection. 
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9.1 Maximum Relevance Feature Selection 
In Maximum Relevance feature selection, the objective is to identify a subset of 
k features among a set of n features such that the mutual information between the k 
features and the class is maximized. In other words, Maximum Relevance feature 
selection maximizes 
/ ( * > ) = I L ^ > ) . O ( ^ ; 
X W 
where X' is a feature vector of size k. Identifying maximally relevant features by 
calculating I\X ,W) is computationally prohibitive, especially when there are a large 
number of features, because (1) computing I\X ,W) requires estimating higher order 
probability terms, which require a minimum of M*2n computations assuming that there 
are M training samples and that each of the n features has exactly two values and (2) the 
consideration of all possible subsets of features requires computing I\X ,W) for 
number of times. One is therefore forced to choose approximations to Maximum 
Relevance feature selection. A possible way to approximate Maximum Relevance feature 
selection is to calculate the mutual information between the individual features and class 
and then, incrementally select k features with the highest relevance, so that the selected 
k features maximize 
However, it is likely that the k features selected through Maximum Relevance 
feature selection may contain large dependencies. That means that features may highly 
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depend on each other, and therefore removing any one of them may not significantly 
change the overall classification error. To eliminate such redundancy but at the same time 
retain relevance of the features to the classes, Maximum Relevance Minimum 
Redundancy feature selection is used. A brief description of Maximum Relevance 
Minimum Redundancy feature selection follows. 
9.2 Maximum Relevance Minimum 
Redundancy (MRMR) 
Let F be a set containing n features {x,,x2,...,xn}. Let S(S cz F) be a set of k-1 
features which jointly have the largest dependency on the class variable W. The 
objective of Maximum Relevance Minimum Redundancy (MRMR) is to add the kth 
feature x. from F into S so that x; maximizes 
l(xj, W) - y-T ]T l(Xj, Xj), ieF Equation 9.1 
HY/eS 
From Equation 9.1, it is clear that a feature is selected from F not only if it maximizes the 
mutual information with the class variable W, but also if it is unpredictable by the 
current set of already selected features in S. The criterion in Equation 9.1 can be applied 
incrementally to select a set of k features from a set of n features that optimally 
characterize the class variable W. The steps for performing MRMR feature selection are: 
1) (Initialization Step) Set F to contain the initial set of n features; S containing the 
final set of k features is initialized to empty. 
2) Compute the mutual information between W and each of the individual features 
inF. 
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3) (Selection of the first feature) Select the first feature x. that maximizes /(x,., W); 
Remove xt from F and add x. to S. 
4) Repeat until |S| = k 
a. Compute the mutual information between pairs of variables I\xj ,Xj) such 
that x(. e F and x. e S, if it is not already available. 
b. (Selection of the next feature) Select feature xi e F, which maximizes the 
criterion l(xi,W)-T—i^lI\xi,Xj);a.dd xt to S; remove x, from/7. 
In several studies (see [16] and [37]), the above procedure for MRMR feature selection 
has been empirically shown to decrease classification error and improve classification 
results. However, until now, the criterion used in MRMR feature selection (Equation 9.1) 
has been used as heuristic, without formal proof showing how the criterion is 
instrumental in reducing classification error. In the next section, we present a set of 
derivations to show that the MRMR feature selection procedure, under some 
assumptions, gives an upper bound on the Bayes error rate. 
9.3 Relationship Between MRMR Feature 
Selection and Bayes Error Rate 
In this section we derive the relationship between MRMR feature selection and 
Bayes error rate and show that the criterion of MRMR feature selection (Equation 9.1) is 
an approximation to an upper bound of Bayes error rate. Let X = (X, ,X2,...,X„) denote 
an ^-dimensional discrete random feature vector. Let W = (co/,co2,...,con) be a discrete 
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random variables whose values are the class labels. Let x = (x,,x?,...,xn) be a value of 
the feature vector X and co is a value of W. 
Assumption 9.1 The features xl,x2,...,xn_1 are independent features and 
x,,x2,..., xn_j are conditionally independent given the feature xn. 
Lemma 9.1 If x,,x2,...,xn_, are independent features and if x,,x2,...,xn_1 are 
conditionally independent given the feature xn (Assumption 8.4.1), then 
n-1 
P\xn \x1,x2,...,xn_I) = -j— y|„_2 • 
Proof: 
From Assumption 9.1, it follows that 
P(x,,x2,...,xn_j) = P{x.j)P(X2)...P(xn_j) and Equation 9.2 
P(x,,x2,...,xn_, | xJ = P(x, | x„)P{x2 \xj...P{xn_, \xn). Equation 9.3 
Using Bayes formula, Equation 9.3 can be expanded as 
p/
 r r | r ^ ,., [Pi*. I *, M * „ I *, )• • • HX„ I *„-, )] [Pi*, Y{X2 )• • • ^ - 7 )] 
r\xnx2T">xn-l I Xn)~ r_,/ Y\„-l 
IA*JJ 
Equation 9.4 
From Bayes formula, we have 
P(x„\x,,x,,...,x ,) = p(x>'x2>->x»-, \X„)HXJ Equation9.5 
Substituting Equation 9.4 in Equation 9.5, we get 
P(Y . r r x_ [P{x„ \ x,)p(xn \x2)...P(x„ \ xn__,)] [Pjx,)P{x2)...P(x„_,)] 
Equation 9.6 
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Using Equation 9.1 in Equation 9.6, we get 
Kxj^Mxjx2)...p(xjx„_/)]_n^i^) n-l 
P{*„ •*"/ ; - * 2 ' - • • > • * , „-,)- W.Y2 H*Jr2 
Thus, Lemma 9.1 is proved. 
Lemma 9.2 If x,,x2,...,xn_, are independent features and if x,,x2,...,xn_, are 
conditionally independent given the feature xn (Assumption 9.1), then the conditional 
entropy function H(xn \x,,x2,..., xn_,) is equal to 
H{xn)-%l{Xi,xn), 
where l{xl,xn) is the mutual information between features xt and xn. 
Proof: 
It is well known (see [15]) that the conditional entropy function H(xn \x,,x2,...,xn_,) 
can be expanded as 
H(xn \x„x2,...,xn_,) = - ^tP[x1,x2,...,x,,)logP(xll \x,,x2,...,xn_,). Equation 9.7 
x,,x,,...,x„ 
From Lemma 9.1, P(xn\x1,x2,...,xn_1) in Equation 9.7 can be replaced by 
n-l 
npki^) 
1=7 
K*jr •, so that 
( n-\ 
" \Xn I Xl' X2 i • • •' Xn-\ ) ~ 2-1 V*l' X2 ' • • •' Xn )*®8\ 
x,,x2,...,x„ ]>oor 
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n-l 
= ~ TAX1 >X2>'~>Xn)^}0gP(xn | X,.) + (n-2) YAX>'X2>• • • ' X n ) l ° ^ i X n ) 
«-; 
n-l 
= YjH(xn \xt)-(n-2)H{xn) Equation 9. 
where H(xn) is the entropy and H(xn \ xt) is the conditional entropy defined as 
#(0 = -I^>gP(xJand 
xn 
H(Xn\Xi)=-TAXn>Xi)l0&iXn I Xi) 
x
n >•*?' 
respectively. It is known (see [15]) that the conditional entropy H(xn \x() can be 
expanded as 
H(xn \Xi) = H(xn)-l(xi,xn) Equation 9.9 
where •*\xi>Xn)~ ?f\xi'xn)^SZ7 Vw \ is the mutual information between the 
features x. and xn. By substituting Equation 9.9 in Equation 9.8, we get 
n-l n-l 
H(xn\x„x2,...,xn_,) = YdH(xn)-Ydl(xi,xH)-(n-2)H(xn) 
i=l i=l 
= {n-l)H{Xy{n-2)H{xn)-Yl{xi,x„) 
i=l 
= H(xn)-^(xi,xlt) 
i=l 
Thus, Lemma 9.2 is proved. 
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Assumption 9.2 The features independent. 
Lemma 9.3 If x,,x2,...,xn are independent features (Assumption 9.2) and co is the class 
label associated with the feature vector (x ; ,x7 , . . . ,xn) , then the joint entropy function 
H[(i),xl,x2,...,xn) is equal to 
#(ffl)+S#M-ZJfa*,) 
Proof: 
By the chain rule of entropy (see [15]), the joint entropy function H\o>,x1,x2,...,xn) can 
be written as 
H(a,xJ,x2,...,xn) = H((i))+ H(X, | co) + H(x2 | X,,CO)H \-H{xn I xl,x2,...,xn_,,a) 
Equation 9.10 
If the features x,, x2,..., xn are independent (by Assumption 9.2), then 
H(xn \x„X2,...,Xn_„<a)=- YJP(XnX2>--->Xn>(i))logP{Xn I XI >X2 > • • •» Xn-1» ® ) 
* ; , J T 2 >•••»*„ >© 
= ~ ZP(Xi'X2v,^„,C>)logP(x„ | CO) 
X / , J : 2 , . . . , *„ ,a> 
= - Z^'^g^ N 
= H(xn | co) 
Equation 9.11 
Similarly, 
H\x2 I x7, co) = H\x2 | co) 
: Equation 9.12 
H(Xn-l \X,>X2>X3--->Xn-2>(£>)=H(Xn-l I'00) 
From Equation 9.11 and Equation 9.12, Equation 9.10 becomes 
H((0,x!,x2,...,xn) = H(co) + H(xl |co) + //(x2 | <»)+••• + H{xn | co) Equation9.13 
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It is known (see [15]) that H{xi | co) can be expanded as //(*,. )-/(co, A:,.). Therefore, 
Equation 9.13 can be written as 
n n 
H(a,xnx2,...,xn) = H((i))+YJH(xi)-YJl(®,xi) 
i=l i=l 
Thus, Lemma 9.3 is proved. 
Theorem 9.1 The Maximum Relevance Minimal Redundancy (MRMR) feature 
selection procedure, which maximizes the criterion 
k k i-l , > 
i=l 1=2 j=l 
minimizes an upper bound on the Bayes Error rate. 
Proof: 
Hellman and Raviv in [33] showed that 
ve <-H((Q I X), Equation 9.14 
where o~e is the Bayes error rate and H(co | X) is the class conditional entropy. Equation 
9.14 shows that greater the value of H{(o\X), the greater is the upper bound on the 
Bayes error rate. Therefore, to minimize classification error, one needs to minimize the 
class conditional entropy //(co | X). It is known (see [15]) that 
H(®\X) = H{(o)-l(X;<o). 
Because l(X;(n) is a negative term, minimizing i/(co | X) is equivalent to 
maximizing l{X; co). As x = (x,, x2,..., xn), we have 
l(X;a>) = l(xnx2,...,xn;o). 
It is known (see [15]) that l(xl,x2,...,xn;(o) can be expanded as 
65 
n _ n 
/(jc7,x7,...,xn;co)= ^T//(x( \xj_,,...,x1)-'^H{xi | JC(._; ,...,*,, co) Equation 9.15 
(=/ ! = / 
TERM 1 TERM 2 
TERM 1 in Equation 9.15 can be written as 
) = H(X,) + H(X2 \X,)+H(X3 \X,,X2)+ — + H(X„ \x,,x2,...,xn_,) 
Equation 9.16 
From Lemma 9.2, we have 
H(x2 \X, ) = H(x2) - l(x2 ,xj) 
H(x3 I x2,x,) = H(X3)-I(X3,X])-I(X3,X2) 
Equation 9.17 
H(xn \xI,x2,...,xn_,) = H{xn)-YJl{xi,xn) 
Now using Equation 9.17, Equation 9.16 can be rewritten as 
n n n i-\ , . 
X H(x> I xi-x»• • • > xi) = Z H(xt)- Z Z 7 U ' x ; ) Equation 9.18 
1=1 i=l 1=2 j=\ 
Replacing TERM 1 in Equation 9.15 using Equation 9.18 gives 
n n i-\ . . n 
l(x\,x2,...,xn-,co) = YJH{xl)-YJYjI\xi>xj)-YjH(xi \x,.i,...,xlfe)) Equation 9.19 
1=1 i=2 j=\ 
TERM 1 TERM 2 
From Equation 9.19, it is straight forward to see that maximizing TERM 1 results 
in maximizing l(xl,x2,...,xn;o)), thereby minimizing the upper bound on Bayes error 
rate. Here, we point out that TERM 1 does not involve class information and therefore, 
the MRMR feature selection based on maximizing TERM 1 is an unsupervised version of 
MRMR feature selection. Now, TERM 2 in Equation 9.19 can be written as 
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YjHixi \xi_,,-..,x,,(i>) = H(xI \(o)+H(x2 \xl,®)+--- + H(xn | 
Equation 9.20 
It is known (see [15]) that 
H(oi,x1,x2,...,xt!) = H((i})+H(x1 \o>)+H(x2 \X1,<Q)+--- + H(XII \x,,x2,...,xn_na>). 
Equation 9.21 
Using Equation 9.21, Equation 9.20 can be written as 
^ H\xi | xt_,,...,x,, co) = //(co, x7, JC2 ,..., xn)- //(co). Equation 9.22 
/=/ 
From Lemma 9.3, we have 
n n 
//(co, x,, x2,..., xn) = //(co) + ^ H{xi) - ^ /(co, xt). Equation 9.23 
i=l i=l 
From Equation 9.23, Equation 9.22 can be written as 
n n n 
£ H{xi | x,_, ,...,x1,®) = YJH{xi)-Yj ^ xt) Equation 9.24 
i=l i=l i=l 
Now, substituting Equation 9.24 for TERM 2 in Equation 9.19, we get 
n n i—l , v n n 
l(xi,x2,...,xn)0)) = ^ H(xi)-^^jl(xi,xJ)-YJH(xi)-^l(co,xi) Equation 9.25 
1=2 y=l 
On simplifying Equation 9.25, we get 
l(xnx2,...,xH;G))=^il(to,xl)-J^Yil(xl,Xj). 
n i-1 
Equation 9.26 
Substituting Equation 9.26, in Equation 9.14 
' 2 
I 1 
i=2 j=l 
n i-1 
//(co)- X / ( c o , * , ) - X I / ( * , . , x , ) 
1=2 y = / 
Equation 9.27 
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From Equation 9.27, it is straight forward to see that any set of A: features (k < n) that 
f 
maximize the criterion for MRMR feature selection, i.e., E7(ro>*<)-£E7(*/»*y) 
V •=' 1=2 .1=1 
also maximize ,xn;<X)), thereby minimizing an upper bound on Bayes error 
rate. Thus, we prove Theorem 9.1. 
CHAPTER 10 
THE KDD CUP 1999 INTRUSION 
DETECTION DATASET 
The dependence tree based anomaly detection method is tested using the 
benchmark KDD Cup 1999 dataset [41]. The entire KDD Cup 1999 dataset contains 
about 5,000,000 connection records. However, a concise dataset known as the "10% 
training" dataset has been provided to allow for faster training of anomaly and intrusion 
detection systems. We use the 10% training dataset. The 10% training dataset consists of 
494, 021 connection records, each record labeled as normal or as a specific attack type. 
There are 22 different attack types in the training dataset. The KDD Cup 1999 test dataset 
contains 311, 030 connection records. The test dataset contains 17 additional attack types 
that are not present in the training data. 
Each connection record in the KDD Cup 1999 dataset contains 41 features and a 
label indicating whether the connection is normal or an attack. The 41 features fall into 
three categories: (1) basic features, (2) content features, and (3) temporal features. A brief 
description of the 41 KDD Cup 1999 dataset features is provided in the following section. 
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10.1 Features in KDD Cup 1999 Dataset 
Here we give a brief description of features in the KDD Cup 1999 datasets. The 
first nine features are known as "basic" features and contain intrinsic information of a 
single network connection. The basic features are described in Table 10.1. 
Table 10.1 Basic features of KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Feature Name 
Duration 
Protocol 
Service 
Source Bytes 
Destination Bytes 
Flag 
Land 
Wrong Fragment 
Urgent 
Description 
Length (number of seconds) of the connection 
Type of the protocol, e.g. top, udp, etc. 
Network service on the destination, e.g., http, telnet, etc. 
Number of data bytes from source to destination 
Number of data bytes from destination to source 
Normal or error status of the connection 
1 if connection is from/to the same host/port; 0 otherwise 
Number of "wrong" fragments 
Number of urgent packets 
The next thirteen features in a KDD Cup 1999 connection record are known as 
"content" features. These features use domain knowledge to asses the payload of TCP 
packets. A brief description of content features is given in Table 10.2. 
Table 10.2 Content features of KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
No. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Feature Name 
Hot 
Num failed logins 
Logged in 
Num compromised 
Root shell 
Su attempted 
Num root 
Num file creations 
Num shells 
Num access files 
Num outbound cmds 
Description 
Number of "hot"' indicators 
Number of failed login attempts 
1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise 
Number of compromised" conditions 
1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise 
1 if "su root'" command attempted; 0 otherwise 
Number of "root"' accesses 
Number of file creation operations 
Number of shell prompts 
Number of operations on access control files 
Number of outbound commands in an ftp session 
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21 
22 
Is hot login 
Is_guest_login 
1 if the login belongs to the "hot" list; 0 otherwise 
1 if the login is a "guest" 'login; 0 otherwise 
The next nineteen features in a connection record are known as "temporal" 
features. These features are collected over a 2 second time-window. A brief description 
of content features is given in Table 10.3. 
Table 10.3 Temporal features of KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
No. 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
Feature Name 
Count 
Serror rate 
Rerror rate 
Same srv rate 
Diff srv rate 
Srvcount 
Srv serror rate 
Srv rerror rate 
Srv diff host rate 
dst_host_count 
dst_host_srv_count 
dst_host_same_srv_rate 
Dst_host_diff_srv_rate 
dst host_same_src_port rate 
dst host srv diff host rate 
dst_host_serror_rate 
dst_host_srv_serror_rate 
dst_host_rerror_rate 
d s thos t s rv re r ro r r a t e 
Description 
Number of connections to the same host as the 
current connection 
Percentage of connections that have "SYN"' errors 
Percentage of connections that have "REJ" errors 
Percentage of connections to the same service 
Percentage of connections to different services 
Number of connections to the same service as the 
current connection 
Percentage of connections that have "SYN" errors 
Percentage of connections that have "REJ" errors 
Percentage of connections to different hosts 
Number of connections to the same destination host 
as the current connection 
Percentage of connections to the same service at the 
destination host 
Percentage of connections to different services at 
the destination host 
Percentage of connections to different services at 
the destination host 
Number of connections to the same port at 
destination host 
Percentage of connections to different hosts at the 
destination host 
Percentage of connections that have "SYN" errors 
at the destination host 
Percentage of connections that have "SYN" errors 
at the destination host 
Percentage of connections that have "REJ" errors at 
the destination host 
Percentage of connections that have "REJ" errors at 
the destination host 
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It is to be noted here that all continuous features in the KDD Cup 1999 dataset 
(i.e., Duration, Source Bytes, Destination Bytes, and all "content" features) are 
discretized using Fayyad and Irani's discretization method [50] before being input to the 
dependence tree based anomaly detection method. 
Table 10.4 gives the number of normal and attack connection records in the KDD 
Cup 1999 training and test datasets. There are four classes of attacks in KDD Cup 1999: 
(1) denial-of-service (DoS) attacks (e.g., "syn flood"), (2) surveillance and other probing 
(Probe) attacks (e.g., "port scanning"), (3) unauthorized access attacks to local superuser 
privileges (U2R) (e.g., "buffer overflow"), and (4) unauthorized access from a remote 
machine (R2L) (e.g., "guess password"). The training data contains 24 different attack 
types that fall in to one of the four classes. The KDD Cup 1999 test data includes an 
addition 14 attack types that are not present in the training data. 
Table 10.4 Distribution of normal and attack connections in the 
KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
Dataset 
Training 
Testing 
Normal 
97278 
60593 
DOS 
391458 
229853 
PROBE 
4107 
4166 
U2R 
52 
228 
R2L 
1126 
16189 
Total 
494021 
311029 
The major motivations for using the benchmark KDD Cup 1999 datasets are: 
• The KDD Cup 1999 dataset has been used popularly as a standard for 
comparing the performance of intrusion detection methods. This allows us to 
compare the performance of our dependence tree based anomaly detection method 
with the performance of the other intrusion detection methods reported in recent 
literature. 
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• The data instances in KDD Cup 1999 test dataset are labeled, making it possible 
for us to verify the detection accuracy and false positive rate of our dependence tree 
based anomaly detection method. 
• The KDD Cup 1999 test dataset contains 17 additional attacks that are not 
included in the training dataset. This feature of the dataset allows us to gauge the 
performance of the dependence tree based anomaly detection method on unseen or 
new attacks. 
CHAPTER 11 
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
In this chapter we present the results of MRMR feature selection and the results of 
the dependence tree based anomaly detection method on the KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
11.1 Results of MRMR Feature Selection on 
KDD Cup 1999 Dataset 
In Table 11.1, we give the results of MRMR supervised feature selection (see 
Equation 9.26) on KDD Cup 1999 datasets. Each feature in Table 11.1 is ranked based on 
its relevance to the class variable. 
Table 11.1 The first eight features in KDD Cup 1999 datasets selected 
through MRMR supervised feature selection. 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Feature No. 
5 
14 
6 
32 
23 
12 
37 
31 
Feature Name 
Source Bytes 
Root shell 
Flag 
Dst host count 
Count 
Logged in 
Dst host srv diff host rate 
Srv diff host rate 
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In Table 11.2, we give the results of MRMR unsupervised feature selection (see 
Equation 9.19) on KDD Cup 1999 datasets. Each feature in Table 11.2 is ranked based on 
its entropy value. 
Table 11.2 The first eight features in KDD Cup 1999 datasets selected 
through MRMR unsupervised feature selection. 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Feature No. 
23 
24 
5 
33 
3 
35 
34 
36 
Feature Name 
Count 
Srv Count 
Source Bytes 
Dst host srv count 
Service 
Dst host diff srv rate 
Dst host same srv rate 
Dst host same src port rate 
Only eight of the 41 KDD Cup 1999 features have been incrementally selected by 
both the supervised and unsupervised MRMR feature selection methods. For the 
remaining features, the supervised and unsupervised MRMR feature selection criteria 
(Equation 9.26 and Equation. 9.19) incurred negative values, meaning that the remaining 
features had more redundancy than relevance to classification. Next, we present the 
results of the dependence tree based anomaly detection method on the features selected 
through the supervised and unsupervised versions of MRMR feature selection method. 
11.2 Dependence Tree Results 
The performance of the dependence tree based anomaly detection method is 
gauged using three measures: (1) detection accuracy, which is the percentage of instances 
correctly detected in each of the five classes (i.e., normal, denial-of-service attack, probe 
attack, user-to-root attack, and remote-to-login attack), (2) false positive rate, which is the 
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percentage of normal instances detected as attacks, and (3) the total attack detection 
accuracy, which is the percentage of all attacks correctly detected. Next, we present the 
results of the dependence tree based anomaly detection method using the features 
selected by supervised MRMR feature selection method (see Table 11.1). 
11.2.1 Dependence Tree Results 
with Supervised MRMR 
Selection 
In this section we present the class-wise detection accuracy of dependence trees 
built using the features selected by the supervised MRMR selection algorithm. Figure 
11.1 shows dependence trees with two features: Source (5) and Root_shell (14). The 
class-wise detection accuracy is 93.68% for Normal, 68.9% for DoS, 94.89% for Probe, 
17.54% for U2R, and 3.5% for R2L. The total attack detection accuracy is 91.11% at a 
false positive rate of 6.31%o. 
Figure 11.1 Dependence trees with two features (5,14) for classifying Normal, DOS, 
Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
Figure 11.2 shows dependence trees with three features: Source (5), Rootshell 
(14), and Flag (6). The class-wise detection accuracy for the dependence trees in Figure 
11.2 is 97.45% for Normal, 68.91% for DoS, 92.51% for gQProbe, 17.98% for U2R, and 
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0.01% for R2L. The total attack detection accuracy is 89.40% at a false positive rate of 
2.53%. 
Figure 11.2 Dependence trees with three features (5,14, 6) for classifying Normal, 
DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
Figure 11.3 shows dependence trees with four features: Source (5), Root_shell 
(14), Flag (6), and Dst_host_count (32). The class-wise detection accuracy for the 
dependence trees in Figure 11.3 is 97.87% for Normal, 68.91% for DoS, 91.14% for 
Probe, 12.28% for U2R, and 2.13% for R2L. The total attack detection accuracy is 
89.56% at a false positive rate of 2.13%. 
@ © © © 
Normal DoS Probe U2R R2L 
Figure 11.3 Dependence trees with four features (5,14, 6,32) for classifying Normal, 
DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
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Figure 11.4 shows dependence trees with five features: Source (5), Rootshell 
(14), Flag (6), Dst_host_count (32), and Count (23). The class-wise detection accuracy 
for the dependence trees in Figure 11.4 is 97.89% for Normal, 93.83% for DoS, 81.18% 
for Probe, 12.28% for U2R, and 0.01% for R2L. The total attack detection accuracy is 
88.30% at a false positive rate of 2.13%. 
Normal DoS Probe U2R R2L 
Figure 11.4 Dependence trees with five features (5,14, 6,32, 23) for classifying 
Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
Figure 11.5 shows dependence trees with six features: Source (5), Rootshell 
(14), Flag (6), Dst_host_count (32), Count (23), and Logged_in (12). The class-wise 
detection accuracy for the dependence trees in Figure 11.5 is 97.95% for Normal, 93.83% 
for DoS, 81.93% for Probe, 9.658% for U2R, and 0.01% for R2L. The total attack 
detection accuracy is 88.31% at a false positive rate of 2.0%. 
Figure 11.5 Dependence trees with six features (5,14, 6, 32, 23,12) for classifying 
Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
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Figure 11.6 shows dependence trees with seven features: Source (5), Rootshell 
(14), Flag (6), Dsthostcount (32), Count (23), Logged_in (12), and 
Dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate (37). The class-wise detection accuracy for the dependence 
trees in Figure 11.6 is 98.90% for Normal, 93.82% for DoS, 77.2% for Probe, 9.21% for 
U2R, and 0.03% for R2L. The total attack detection accuracy is 88.21% at a false 
positive rate of 1.1%. 
Figure 11.6 Dependence trees with seven features (5,14, 6,32,23,12,37) for 
classifying Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in 
KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
Figure 11.7 shows dependence trees with eight features: Source (5), Rootshell 
(14), Flag (6), Dst_host_count (32), Count (23), Logged_in (12), 
D s t h o s t s r v d i f f h o s t r a t e (37), and Srv_diff_host_rate (31). The class-wise detection 
accuracy for the dependence trees in Figure 11.7 is 98.76%) for Normal, 93.81%) for DoS, 
68.24%, for Probe, 9.21% for U2R, and 0.01% for R2L. The total attack detection 
accuracy is 88.07%> at a false positive rate of 1.2%. 
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Figure 11.7 Dependence trees with eight features (5,14, 6, 32, 23,12, 37, 31) 
for classifying Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in 
KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
11.2.2 Dependence Tree Results with 
Unsupervised MRMR 
Selection 
In this section we present the class-wise detection accuracy of dependence trees 
built using the features selected by the unsupervised MRMR feature selection algorithm. 
Figure 11.8 shows dependence trees with two features: Count (23) and Srvcount (24). 
The class-wise detection accuracies for the dependence trees in Figure 11.8 are 60.00% 
for Normal, 81.16% for DoS, 58.74% for Probe, 86.40% for U2R, and 23.92% for R2L. 
The total attack detection accuracy is 97.13% at a false positive rate of 40.00%. 
Normal DoS Probe U2R R2L 
Figure 11.8 Dependence trees with two features (23,24) for classifying Normal, 
DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
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Figure 11.9 shows dependence trees with three features: Count (23), Srvcount 
(24), and Source (5). The class-wise detection accuracies for the dependence trees in 
Figure 11.9 are 92.06% for Normal, 92.90% for DoS, 73.93% for Probe, 27.19% for 
U2R, and 16.17% for R2L. The total attack detection accuracy is 90.85% at a false 
positive rate of 7.94%. 
Normal DoS Probe U2R R2L 
Figure 11.9 Dependence trees with three features (23, 24, 5) for classifying Normal, 
DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
Figure 11.10 shows dependence trees with four features: Count (23), Srvcount 
(24), Source (5), and D s t h o s t s r v c o u n t (33). The class-wise detection accuracies for 
the dependence trees in Figure 11.10 are 98.79% for Normal, 92.64% for DoS, 68.72% 
for Probe, 42.11% for U2R, and 0.43% for R2L. The total attack detection accuracy is 
87.92% at a false positive rate of 1.2%. 
Figure 11.10 Dependence trees with four features (23, 24, 5, 33) for classifying 
Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
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Figure 11.11 shows dependence trees with five features: Count (23), Srvcount 
(24), Source (5), Dst_host_srv_count (33), and Service (3). The class-wise detection 
accuracies for the dependence trees in Figure 11.11 are 99.50% for Normal, 92.82% for 
DoS, 72.30% for 8Probe, 8.33% for U2R, and 0.31% for R2L. The total attack detection 
accuracy is 87.85% at a false positive rate of 0.49%. 
Figure 11.11 Dependence trees with five features (23, 24, 5, 33, 3) for classifying 
Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
Figure 11.12 shows dependence trees with six features: Count (23), Srv_count 
(24), Source (5), Ds thos t s rvcoun t (33), Service (3), and Dst_host_diff_srv_rate (35). 
The class-wise detection accuracies for the dependence trees in Figure 11.12 are 99.64% 
for Normal, 93.88% for DoS, 59.82% for Probe, 3.07% for U2R, and 0.98% for R2L. The 
total attack detection accuracy is 87.57%) at a false positive rate of 0.36%. 
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Normal DoS Probe U2R R2L 
Figure 11.12 Dependence trees with six features (23,24, 5,33,3,35) for classifying 
Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
Figure 11.13 shows dependence trees with seven features: Count (23), Srvcount 
(24), Source (5), Dst_host_srv_count (33), Service (3), Dsthostdiffsrvrate (35), and 
Dst_host_same_srv_rate (34). The class-wise detection accuracies for the dependence 
trees in Figure 11.3 are 99.70% for Normal, 93.62% for DoS, 61.69% for Probe, 3.07% 
for U2R, and 0.97% for R2L. The total attack detection accuracy is 87.45% at a false 
positive rate of 0.30%. 
Figure 11.13 Dependence trees with seven features (23, 24, 5, 33, 3, 35, 34) for 
classifying Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in 
KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
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Figure 11.14 shows dependence trees with seven features: Count (23), Srv_count 
(24), Source (5), Ds thos t s rvcoun t (33), Service (3), Dst_host_diff_srv_rate (35), 
Dst_host_same_srv_rate (34), and Dst_host_same_src_port_rate (36). The class-wise 
detection accuracies for the dependence trees in Figure 11.14 are 99.76% for Normal, 
93.65% for DoS, 57.73% for Probe, 3.51% for U2R, and 1.02% for R2L. The total attack 
detection accuracy is 87.38% at a false positive rate of 0.24%. 
Figure 11.14 Dependence trees with eight features (23,24, 5,33,3,35,34,36) 
for classifying Normal, DOS, Probe, U2R, and R2L connections in 
KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
11.3 Comparison with Naive Baves and ID3 Anomaly 
Detection Methods 
In this section, we compare the performance of dependence tree based anomaly 
detection method with the performance of naive Bayes [13] and ID3 [14] anomaly 
detection using the KDD Cup 1999 features selected from supervised and unsupervised 
MRMR feature selection. 
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11.3.1 Results with Supervised 
MRMR Feature Selection 
Table 11.3 gives the detection accuracies and false positive rates obtained by 
three methods: (1) dependence tree based anomaly detection (DTree), (2) naive Bayes 
(NB), and (3) ID3 decision tree (ID3) on KDD Cup 1999 dataset. The features in Table 
11.3 are obtained using the supervised MRMR feature selection method. 
Table 11.3 Results of Dependence Tree based anomaly detection (DTree), Naive 
Bayes (NB) anomaly detection, and ID3 anomaly detection on KDD Cup 1999 
features selected by the supervised MRMR feature selection method. 
Features 
5,14 
5, 14,6 
5, 14, 6, 
32 
5, 14, 6, 
32,23 
5, 14, 6, 
32,23, 12 
5, 14, 6, 
32, 23, 
12,37 
5, 14, 6, 
32, 23, 
12,37,31 
Method 
DTree 
NB 
ID3 
DTree 
NB 
ID3 
DTree 
NB 
ID3 
DTree 
NB 
ID3 
DTree 
NB 
ID3 
DTree 
NB 
ID3 
DTree 
NB 
ID3 
Normal 
93.68 
98.50 
98.46 
97.47 
99.40 
98.81 
97.87 
99.50 
98.81 
97.89 
98.70 
97.80 
97.95 
98.60 
97.80 
98.90 
98.60 
97.97 
98.76 
98.63 
99.65 
DoS 
68.90 
94.60 
94.58 
68.91 
94.30 
94.28 
68.91 
94.20 
94.24 
93.83 
97.10 
94.26 
93.83 
97.10 
94.26 
93.82 
97.10 
94.27 
93.81 
97.01 
94.27 
Probe 
94.89 
17.70 
17.69 
92.51 
17.90 
24.89 
91.14 
19.80 
18.36 
81.18 
26.90 
69.56 
81.93 
35.40 
69.49 
77.20 
30.30 
69.49 
68.24 
31.04 
69.16 
U2R 
17.54 
9.20 
8.77 
17.98 
11.00 
6.14 
12.28 
9.20 
5.26 
12.28 
9.20 
5.26 
9.65 
9.20 
3.51 
9.21 
10.10 
4.83 
9.21 
10.53 
4.82 
R2L 
3.50 
0.40 
0.36 
0.02 
0 
0.02 
0.02 
0 
0.02 
0.02 
0 
0.03 
0.02 
0 
0.01 
0.04 
0.80 
0.03 
0.02 
1.15 
0.02 
TAD 
91.11 
87.14 
87.14 
89.40 
86.83 
86.95 
89.56 
86.82 
86.80 
88.30 
89.54 
87.68 
88.31 
89.72 
87.68 
88.21 
89.68 
87.68 
88.07 
89.64 
87.67 
FPR 
6.30 
1.50 
1.54 
2.53 
0.60 
1.19 
2.13 
0.50 
1.19 
2.11 
1.30 
2.20 
2.06 
1.40 
2.20 
1.10 
1.40 
2.03 
1.24 
1.37 
0.35 
From Table 11.3, we observe that there are minor differences between the 
performances of the three methods when detecting normal class except in the case of the 
DTree method with two features (i.e., 5 and 13), which has the least detection accuracy of 
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93.68% for normal instances (and therefore, the highest false positive rate of 6.30%). 
However, in this case we note that the DTree method yields relatively high detection 
accuracies in detecting Probe, U2R, and R2L attacks. Further, the DTree method with 
three features (5, 14, and 6) and four features (5, 14, 6, and 32) outperforms the NB and 
ID3 methods in detection Probe and U2R attacks. In these cases, however, the DTree 
method has relatively lower accuracies (68.91% with three features and 68.91% with four 
features) in detecting DoS attacks. The reason for such low detection accuracies is that a 
considerable number of DoS instances have been misclassified as Probe attacks. Such 
misclassification, though undesirable, is better than the unacceptably low detection 
accuracies for Probe attacks, achieved by NB and ID3 methods. In the rest of the cases 
with five, six, seven, and eight features, the DTree method outperforms the NB and the 
ID3 methods in detecting Probe and U2R attacks, yet maintaining very comparable 
accuracies in detecting Normal, DoS, and R2L attacks. 
11.3.2 Results with Unsupervised 
MRMR Feature Selection 
Table 11.4 gives the percentage attack detection accuracies and false positive 
rates obtained by three methods: (1) DTree, (2) NB, and (3) ID3 on KDD Cup 1999 
dataset. The features in Table 11.4 are obtained using the unsupervised MRMR feature 
selection method. 
From Table 11.4, we observe that the DTree method outperforms the NB and ID3 
methods in detecting normal instances except in two cases: (1) the DTree method with 
two features (23 and 24), and (2) the DTree method with three features (23, 24, and 5). 
However, in both these cases, we note the detection accuracies of the DTree method are 
considerably higher than the detection accuracies of NB and ID3 methods in detecting 
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Probe, U2R, and R2L attacks. The DTree method with four features (23, 24, 5, and 33) 
achieves detection accuracy as high as 42.11% for U2R attacks, which is significantly 
higher than the detection accuracies of NB and ID3 methods for detecting U2R attacks 
with four features. The DTree method with five features (23, 24, 5, 33, and 3) achieves 
comparable detection accuracies for DoS, Probe, and U2R methods at a false positive rate 
as low as 0.5%, which is considerably lower than the false positive rate of NB and ID3 
methods implemented with five features. The DTree method with six, seven, and eight 
features achieves fine improvements in detecting normal instances but falls behind the 
NB and ID3 methods in detecting Probe, U2R and R2L methods 
Table 11.4 Results of Dependence Tree based anomaly detection (DTree), Naive 
Bayes (NB) anomaly detection, and ID3 anomaly detection on KDD Cup 1999 
features selected by the unsupervised MRMR feature selection method. 
Features 
23,24 
23, 24, 5 
23, 24, 5, 
33 
23, 24, 5, 
33,3 
23, 24, 5, 
33,3,35 
23, 24, 5, 
33,3,35, 
34 
23, 24, 5, 
33,3,35, 
34,36 
Method 
DTree 
NB 
ID3 
DTree 
NB 
ID3 
DTree 
NB 
ID3 
DTree 
NB 
ID3 
DTree 
NB 
ID3 
DTree 
NB 
ID3 
DTree 
NB 
ID3 
Normal 
60.00 
97.90 
98.28 
92.06 
97.70 
98.25 
98.79 
98.00 
96.26 
99.50 
97.80 
97.95 
99.64 
97.90 
97.81 
99.70 
97.60 
97.75 
99.76 
97.80 
97.74 
DoS 
81.16 
93.40 
82.62 
92.90 
96.60 
94.12 
92.64 
95.20 
94.10 
92.82 
95.10 
94.17 
93.88 
95.80 
93.80 
93.62 
95.00 
93.71 
93.65 
95.00 
93.71 
Probe 
58.74 
10.80 
45.10 
73.93 
37.80 
58.43 
68.72 
73.40 
65.22 
72.30 
76.20 
74.44 
59.82 
73.20 
74.56 
61.69 
72.00 
74.39 
57.73 
72.40 
74.51 
U2R 
86.40 
0 
0 
27.19 
0 
0 
42.11 
0 
1.04 
8.33 
10.50 
7.02 
3.07 
10.10 
3.51 
3.07 
10.50 
3.070 
3.51 
8.30 
3.07 
R2L 
23.92 
0 
0 
16.17 
3.50 
0.72 
0.43 
1.50 
0.38 
0.32 
8.00 
0.49 
0.98 
8.10 
1.01 
0.98 
8.50 
1.90 
1.02 
8.80 
1.90 
TAD 
97.13 
85.92 
76.58 
90.85 
89.52 
87.40 
87.92 
88.72 
87.48 
87.85 
89.07 
87.70 
87.57 
89.69 
87.40 
87.45 
88.91 
87.37 
87.38 
88.93 
87.38 
FPR 
40.00 
2.10 
1.72 
7.95 
2.30 
1.75 
1.21 
2.00 
3.74 
0.50 
2.20 
2.05 
0.36 
2.10 
2.19 
0.30 
2.40 
2.25 
0.24 
2.20 
2.26 
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11.4 Comparison with Other Studies on 
KDD Cup 1999 Datasets 
In Table 11.5, we compare the class-wise detection accuracies of dependence tree 
based anomaly detection method with results reported in Song et al. [19] and Bouzida et 
al. [18] over the KDD Cup 1999 dataset. 
Table 11.5 Comparison of class-wise percentage detection accuracies and false 
positive rates of the dependence tree based anomaly detection method with the 
network attack detection methods reported in Bouzida et al. and Song et al. 
Work 
Ours 
[18] 
Classification Models 
DTree with four supervised 
MRMR selected features. 
DTree with five supervised 
MRMR selected features. 
DTree with six supervised 
MRMR selected features. 
DTree with seven supervised 
MRMR selected features. 
DTree with eight supervised 
MRMR selected features. 
DTree with four unsupervised 
MRMR selected features. 
DTree with five unsupervised 
MRMR selected features. 
DTree with seven 
unsupervised MRMR selected 
features. 
DTree with eight unsupervised 
MRMR selected features. 
Nearest neighbor classification 
with 41 features. 
Nearest neighbor classification 
with 4 principal components. 
C4.5 classification with 41 
features. 
C4.5 classification with 4 
principal components. 
Normal 
97.87 
97.89 
97.95 
98.90 
98.76 
98.79 
99.50 
99.70 
99.76 
99.5 
99.50 
99.49 
99.00 
DoS 
68.91 
93.83 
93.83 
93.82 
93.81 
92.64 
92.82 
93.62 
93.65 
97.01 
97.14 
97.31 
97.25 
Probe 
91.14 
81.18 
81.93 
77.20 
68.24 
68.72 
72.30 
61.69 
57.73 
72.01 
74.40 
74.70 
66.80 
U2R 
12.28 
12.28 
9.65 
9.21 
9.21 
42.11 
8.33 
3.07 
3.51 
6.60 
7.91 
4.39 
6.58 
R2L 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.04 
0.02 
0.43 
0.32 
0.98 
1.02 
1.21 
0.80 
5.84 
0.01 
FPR 
2.13 
2.11 
2.06 
1.10 
1.24 
1.21 
0.50 
0.30 
0.24 
0.5 
0.5 
0.51 
1.00 
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[19] 
Genetic programming with lap 
distance (8-4), age 10%. 
Genetic programming with lap 
distance (8-8), age 10%. 
Genetic programming with lap 
distance (16-4), age 10%. 
Genetic programming with lap 
distance (8-4), age 30%. 
Genetic programming with lap 
distance (16-4) age 30%. 
99.7 
98.0 
98.7 
99.1 
98.6 
95.36 
95.6 
95.7 
95.36 
95.5 
48.5 
55.4 
55.1 
62.6 
56.5 
10.10 
18.0 
10.2 
9.2 
11.4 
0.2 
3.4 
1.8 
1.6 
0.8 
0.30 
2.0 
1.3 
0.92 
1.4 
In Table 11.5, we compare the results of dependence tree based anomaly detection 
method with the results reported in two recent papers: (1) Bouzida et al. used nearest 
neighbor classification and C4.5 decision tree with principal component analysis for to 
detect attacks in the KDD Cup 1999 datasets and (2) Song et al. used dynamic 
programming approach to detect attacks in the KDD Cup 1999 datasets. Although other 
studies on intrusion detection using KDD Cup 1999 dataset exist (for example, 
Sarasamma et al. [9][20]), the reason for choosing the works by Bouzida et al. and Song 
et al. for comparison with the dependence tree based anomaly detection method is that 
the false positive rates in these two works are considerably low and are comparable with 
the false positive rates achieved by the dependence tree based anomaly detection method. 
On the other hand, intrusion detection methods reported in Sarasamma et al. yielded an 
unacceptably high false positive rate and therefore are excluded from the comparison. 
The results in Table 11.5, show that at 0.5% false positive rate Bouzida et al.'s 
nearest neighbor classification rule and C4.5 decision tree implemented on 41 features 
achieve detection accuracies that are very similar to the detection accuracies of our 
dependence tree based anomaly detection method with only five features selected through 
unsupervised MRMR feature selection method. Further, Bouzida et al.'s C4.5 decision 
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tree built on 4 principal components extracted from 41 features of the KDD Cup 1999 
data, has a false positive rate 1.0% which is comparable to the false positive rate of the 
dependence tree method with seven features selected through supervised MRMR feature 
selection. In this case, however, our dependence tree based anomaly detection method 
outperforms the C4.5 method in detecting probe and U2R attacks. 
The results in Table 11.5 show that Song et al.'s genetic programming approach 
with tap distance parameters (16-4) at age 10% and (16-4) at age 30% have 1.3% and 
1.4% false positive rates, which are comparable to the 1.24% and 1.21% false positive 
rate of our dependence tree method with eight features selected through supervised 
MRMR feature selection and the dependence tree method with four features selected 
through unsupervised MRMR feature selection, respectively. We note that both these 
dependence trees outperform Song et al.'s genetic programming models with tap distance 
(16-4) in detection probe and U2R attacks. Similarly, we note that the dependence tree 
models outperform the remaining genetic programming models from Song et al. with tap 
distances (8-4) and (8-8) at ages 10% and 30% in detecting probe and U2R attacks, while 
no significant differences in the detection accuracies for DoS attacks have been observed 
between Song et al.'s models and our dependence trees. 
CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
In this dissertation, we developed two novel pattern recognition methods: (1) the 
K-Means+ID3, and (2) the dependence tree method for supervised anomaly detection. 
The first method, K-Means+ID3, was developed to classify data instances into normal or 
anomaly classes. To detect anomaly data instances, the K-Means+ID3 method first 
partitions the training data instances into k disjoint clusters. Then, an ID3 decision tree 
built on each cluster learns the sub-groups within the cluster and partitions the decision 
space into finer classification regions, thereby improving the overall classification 
performance. We compared the performance of K-Means+ID3 method with the 
individual k-means and ID3 methods in terms of six performance measures. Results on 
network anomaly data, Duffing equation data, and mechanical system data showed that 
1. the K-Means+ID3 method outperforms individual k-Means and the ID3 methods 
in terms of six performance measures over the 1998 network anomaly data, 
2. the K-Means+ID3 has a very high detection accuracy (99.12 percent) and AUC 
performance (0.96) over the 1999 network anomaly data, 
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3. the K-Means+ID3 method shows better false positive rate and precision as 
compared to the individual k-Means and the ID3 methods over the 2000 network 
anomaly data, 
4. the false positive rate, precision, and F-measure of the K-Means+ID3 method is 
higher than the k-Means method and lower than the ID3 method over the Duffing 
equation data, and 
5. the K-Means+ID3 method has the highest precision and F-Measure over the 
mechanical system data. 
Future research directions pertaining to the K-Mean+ID3 method include: (1) 
developing theoretical error bounds for K-Measn+ID3 method, and (2) comparing the 
performance of K-Means+ID3 with cascading classifiers developed using different 
clustering methods like hierarchical clustering, adaptive resonance theory (ART) neural 
networks, Kohonen's self-organizing maps and decision trees like C4.5 and Classification 
And Regression Trees (CART). 
The second method, dependence tree based anomaly detection, was developed to 
classify network traffic data instances into one of normal, denial-of-service attack, 
probing attack, user-to-root attack, or remote-to-login attack. The dependence tree based 
anomaly detection method used Bayes classification rule to classify data instances into 
normal or one of the four attack types. Dependence trees were implemented to 
approximate class conditional densities in the Bayes classification rule. For improving the 
classification performance of dependence tree based anomaly detection, supervised and 
unsupervised Maximum Relevance Minimum Redundancy (MRMR) feature selection 
was used to select features that optimally characterize the class information. We derived 
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the theoretical relationship between Bayes error rate, dependence tree based classification 
error, and MRMR feature selection criterion and showed that both dependence tree 
approximation and MRMR feature selection criterion minimize an upper bound on the 
Bayes error rate. The performance of the dependence tree based anomaly detection 
method was demonstrated on the benchmark KDD Cup 1999 dataset. Further, the 
performance of the dependence tree based anomaly detection method was compared with 
the performance of the naive Bayes and the ID3 decision tree methods as well as with the 
nearest neighbor rule and C4.5 decision trees presented in [18] and the genetic 
programming approach presented in [19]. Our results showed that 
1. the dependence tree based anomaly detection method with five and six features 
selected through supervised MRMR feature selection method outperforms the 
naive Bayes classifier and the ID3 decision tree method in detecting probe and 
U2R attacks, 
2. the dependence tree based anomaly detection method with four features selected 
through unsupervised MRMR feature selection method achieves U2R attack 
detection accuracy as high as 42.11% at 1.21% false positive rate, outperforming 
both the naive Bayes and the ID3 methods in detecting U2R attacks, and 
3. the dependence tree based anomaly detection method outperforms Song et al. 's 
[19] genetic programming based anomaly detection models in detecting both 
probe and U2R attacks, while maintaining high detection accuracies in detecting 
normal and denial-of-service attacks. 
Future research directions pertaining to our dependence tree based anomaly 
detection work include (1) using robust kernel density estimators for estimating the class 
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entropy of and mutual information between features and (2) modifying the MRMR 
feature selection criterion by adding a weight matrix to represent different 
misclassification costs so that the features selected through the modified feature selection 
criterion take into account the misclassification costs that may be incurred during 
classification. 
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